Thanks, your post clarified the things that were unclear to me. Jason
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 11 May 2015, at 06:51, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote: >> >> Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to digest >> your summary (and any subsequent comments). >> >> In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia" argument >> that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form of argument to the >> MGA to arrive at a different consclusion, namely that supervenience of >> consciousness on a physical machine (brain, computer) isn't possible. >> >> >> >> But that is the same conclusion than MGA. >> Both MGA and Maudlin shows that there is a serious difficulty in >> maintaining both comp and the physical supervenience. Maudlin leans toward >> abandoning comp, I keep comp and lean toward abandoning materialism. But >> both show their incompatibility. >> >> > Is the incompatibility here with supervenience on the instantaneous > physical state, where state is only the positions and properties of > particles absent how they got there or their history? > > > Usually it is between > - the stream of consciousness (in the 3-1 view, even if later that "3" > will "only" be a first person plural notion, but locally it is an excellent > "3", that is a subtlety intrinsic to the subject) and > - the physical activity of the computer or brain. > > > If so then I can see how this is incompatible with computationalism, for > it is like ascribing consciousness to bits on a tape in a turing machine, > or the RAM in a laptop. > > However I think there is some confusion here, at least I am still confused > about it, whether there is also a denial of supervenience of consciousness > on physically-implemented computations. > > > There is no denial on that. On the contrary, in Platonia, it is the > physical which provides the differentiation of first person plural sharable > realities. The physical plays a key role, but it is itself (re)defined > initially by where the consciousness, and whose one, differentiate. With > comp, that is the doing of the universal numbers. Arithmetic contains a > sort of Indra net. > > > What do MGA / Olympia arguments say about the consciousness resulting from > building an AI on a physical computer, or making a human with a physical > brain? > > > Well, we will open a bottle of champaign. We must just be modest, and > admit that we didn't create the consciousness, which is in arithmetic > (since the time that 2+2=4). We just makes it able to manifest itself > relatively to you. > Even your consciousness is *not* associated or produced by the physical > activity of your brain. A brain just intantiate the relevant state of a > "dreaming" numbers which sleeps (lucidly or not) in Arithmetic. So to > speak. > > Keep in mind there is non brain. The brain idea is in the brain :) There > is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), and computable and non computable relations, some > of which are complex deep, and efficacious in the self-multiplication. > > > > > If it implements (physically) the right computations should it not be > conscious? > > > It seems it has to be, by definition of computationalism. It is just that > it losts its body in passing. > No problem, as he inherit about aleph_zero, if not aleph_one, new > *virtual* bodies in arithmetic. > Not saying that any of this is true, just that it follows from comp and > has testable consequences. > > > > Is there some contention that a physical computation is not the same as > some more fundamental arithmetical compuatation > > > A physical computation, with comp, is an infinity of arithmetical > computations, as seen by the machines supported by that infinity (hoping it > is supportable, but if comp is true, and no white rabbit arrives, I guess > (as a rationalist) that there is a mathematical reason for this, and > indeed, talking with the lobian machine/number, it looks like there is an > explanation. > > > > > > or do MGA / Olympia only aim to show some flaw with mind-brain identity > theory? > > > It shows that computationalism and materialism does not fit as easily as > most materialist would imagine. > > I don't know for Olympia, but MGA, here, is the step eight of the UDA, > where we have already an idea of how the laws of physics *have* to fit with > the purely mathematical calculus on your most probable next sigma_1 events > (by step 7). > > With the pronoun "you" defined in the 3p sense, and in the 3p way, by the > second recursion theorem (D'X' = 'X'X''). > And the 1p is offered on a plateau by using Theatetetus definition on the > 3p-self. It has no name, and is not a machine from the correct 1p view. > > If you believe that a person is its body, the person *became* sort of > zombie, but if their computable activity are self-referentially correct > with their possible continuations, they do incarnate the consciousness, and > in that sense, you can attribute consciousness to them, it is locally > useful, even if the big picture no-one has a body, but a cloud of > infinitely many bodies defined by complex "winning", huge (in the measure > sense) sets of arithmetical relations/histories. > > Bruno > > > > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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