On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote: > > Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to digest > your summary (and any subsequent comments). > > In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia" argument > that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form of argument to the > MGA to arrive at a different consclusion, namely that supervenience of > consciousness on a physical machine (brain, computer) isn't possible. > > > > But that is the same conclusion than MGA. > Both MGA and Maudlin shows that there is a serious difficulty in > maintaining both comp and the physical supervenience. Maudlin leans toward > abandoning comp, I keep comp and lean toward abandoning materialism. But > both show their incompatibility. > > Is the incompatibility here with supervenience on the instantaneous physical state, where state is only the positions and properties of particles absent how they got there or their history? If so then I can see how this is incompatible with computationalism, for it is like ascribing consciousness to bits on a tape in a turing machine, or the RAM in a laptop. However I think there is some confusion here, at least I am still confused about it, whether there is also a denial of supervenience of consciousness on physically-implemented computations. What do MGA / Olympia arguments say about the consciousness resulting from building an AI on a physical computer, or making a human with a physical brain? If it implements (physically) the right computations should it not be conscious? Is there some contention that a physical computation is not the same as some more fundamental arithmetical compuatation or do MGA / Olympia only aim to show some flaw with mind-brain identity theory? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
