On Monday, May 11, 2015, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> >> On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote: >> >> Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to digest >> your summary (and any subsequent comments). >> >> In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia" argument >> that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form of argument to the >> MGA to arrive at a different consclusion, namely that supervenience of >> consciousness on a physical machine (brain, computer) isn't possible. >> >> >> >> But that is the same conclusion than MGA. >> Both MGA and Maudlin shows that there is a serious difficulty in >> maintaining both comp and the physical supervenience. Maudlin leans toward >> abandoning comp, I keep comp and lean toward abandoning materialism. But >> both show their incompatibility. >> >> > Is the incompatibility here with supervenience on the instantaneous > physical state, where state is only the positions and properties of > particles absent how they got there or their history? If so then I can see > how this is incompatible with computationalism, for it is like ascribing > consciousness to bits on a tape in a turing machine, or the RAM in a laptop. > > However I think there is some confusion here, at least I am still confused > about it, whether there is also a denial of supervenience of consciousness > on physically-implemented computations. What do MGA / Olympia arguments say > about the consciousness resulting from building an AI on a physical > computer, or making a human with a physical brain? If it implements > (physically) the right computations should it not be conscious? Is there > some contention that a physical computation is not the same as some more > fundamental arithmetical compuatation or do MGA / Olympia only aim to show > some flaw with mind-brain identity theory? >
If a computation can be physically implemented then it is also "implemented" in Platonia, and so is any associated consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
