On 08 May 2015, at 10:31, LizR wrote:
On 8 May 2015 at 18:24, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote:
Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to
digest your summary (and any subsequent comments).
In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia"
argument that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form
of argument to the MGA to arrive at a different consclusion, namely
that supervenience of consciousness on a physical machine (brain,
computer) isn't possible.
But that is the same conclusion than MGA.
Sorry, yes, I was too hasty here. I gave what I believe to be the
differences between your and Madlin's conclusions in another post:
4. it shows that physical supervenience is impossible, and hence
consciousness isn't the result of computation (Maudlin)
5. it shows that physical supervenience is impossible, and hence, if
consciousness is the result of computation, it can't be supported by
a physical machine (Bruno)
Post in haste, regret at leisure. I often dash off a post in a short
break when I should really be doing something else.
No problem. Sometimes I sum up in saying that both MGA and OLYMPIA
shows just the following things
(With MECH = comp or digital Mechanism, and MAT = weak materialism
(the doctrine asserting that some physical primitive things exists at
the base level):
MECH -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT MECH
or the more symmetrical:
NOT MECH v NOT MAT
I keep MECH, because it is my job. Maudlin suggests that the
materialist might need to abandon computationalism, or modify it, but
he is aware that is difficult and that it would look like adding magic.
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
