On Friday, May 8, 2015 at 4:56:54 AM UTC+2, Liz R wrote: > > On 8 May 2015 at 14:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> Which was rather my conclusion. Since the MGA is not a rigorous argument, >> it was always of very limited utility -- it certainly is insufficient to >> carry the weight of the conclusion that the physical substrate is >> unnecessary for consciousness. > > > I suggested several conclusions. Do you think any of them potentially > carry any weight? > > I don't see a single valid argument against the incompatibility between comp assumption and physical supervenience reached by MGA. Without more rigorous distinction between informal notion of recording and formal notion of Universal Number actualizing computation, or implications of Church's thesis bearing on this, such discourse will be the obvious result.
But such a valid argument against incompatibility, therefore weakness or failure of the argument, is easy to miss with all the ideological hand waving purported to show some flaw, problem, or weakness when these mostly boil down to insisting that comp hypothesis is not true or that MGA is weak when slipping glitchy, informal and unspecified notions of recording and robust, implying their formality without backing it up, into the discussion. Not having time to even read all of it, I also think that Bruno spoon feeding everybody here and being lectured by Bruce on his teaching methodology is cheap; especially considering that Bruno offers his time and effort into answering for free, and out of good faith in informal scientific exchange. In short, I don't have time to read and therefore understand all of it, but with all the lowbrow moves, it seems redundant and beside the point. The truth or falsity of comp is not the issue here. If you can prove such formally, then go publish or show the goods here at least. PGC Zombie Ninja over and out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
