On 11 May 2015, at 06:51, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote:
Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to
digest your summary (and any subsequent comments).
In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia"
argument that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form
of argument to the MGA to arrive at a different consclusion, namely
that supervenience of consciousness on a physical machine (brain,
computer) isn't possible.
But that is the same conclusion than MGA.
Both MGA and Maudlin shows that there is a serious difficulty in
maintaining both comp and the physical supervenience. Maudlin leans
toward abandoning comp, I keep comp and lean toward abandoning
materialism. But both show their incompatibility.
Is the incompatibility here with supervenience on the instantaneous
physical state, where state is only the positions and properties of
particles absent how they got there or their history?
Usually it is between
- the stream of consciousness (in the 3-1 view, even if later that "3"
will "only" be a first person plural notion, but locally it is an
excellent "3", that is a subtlety intrinsic to the subject) and
- the physical activity of the computer or brain.
If so then I can see how this is incompatible with computationalism,
for it is like ascribing consciousness to bits on a tape in a turing
machine, or the RAM in a laptop.
However I think there is some confusion here, at least I am still
confused about it, whether there is also a denial of supervenience
of consciousness on physically-implemented computations.
There is no denial on that. On the contrary, in Platonia, it is the
physical which provides the differentiation of first person plural
sharable realities. The physical plays a key role, but it is itself
(re)defined initially by where the consciousness, and whose one,
differentiate. With comp, that is the doing of the universal numbers.
Arithmetic contains a sort of Indra net.
What do MGA / Olympia arguments say about the consciousness
resulting from building an AI on a physical computer, or making a
human with a physical brain?
Well, we will open a bottle of champaign. We must just be modest, and
admit that we didn't create the consciousness, which is in arithmetic
(since the time that 2+2=4). We just makes it able to manifest itself
relatively to you.
Even your consciousness is *not* associated or produced by the
physical activity of your brain. A brain just intantiate the relevant
state of a "dreaming" numbers which sleeps (lucidly or not) in
Arithmetic. So to speak.
Keep in mind there is non brain. The brain idea is in the brain :)
There is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), and computable and non computable
relations, some of which are complex deep, and efficacious in the self-
multiplication.
If it implements (physically) the right computations should it not
be conscious?
It seems it has to be, by definition of computationalism. It is just
that it losts its body in passing.
No problem, as he inherit about aleph_zero, if not aleph_one, new
*virtual* bodies in arithmetic.
Not saying that any of this is true, just that it follows from comp
and has testable consequences.
Is there some contention that a physical computation is not the same
as some more fundamental arithmetical compuatation
A physical computation, with comp, is an infinity of arithmetical
computations, as seen by the machines supported by that infinity
(hoping it is supportable, but if comp is true, and no white rabbit
arrives, I guess (as a rationalist) that there is a mathematical
reason for this, and indeed, talking with the lobian machine/number,
it looks like there is an explanation.
or do MGA / Olympia only aim to show some flaw with mind-brain
identity theory?
It shows that computationalism and materialism does not fit as easily
as most materialist would imagine.
I don't know for Olympia, but MGA, here, is the step eight of the UDA,
where we have already an idea of how the laws of physics *have* to fit
with the purely mathematical calculus on your most probable next
sigma_1 events (by step 7).
With the pronoun "you" defined in the 3p sense, and in the 3p way, by
the second recursion theorem (D'X' = 'X'X'').
And the 1p is offered on a plateau by using Theatetetus definition on
the 3p-self. It has no name, and is not a machine from the correct 1p
view.
If you believe that a person is its body, the person *became* sort of
zombie, but if their computable activity are self-referentially
correct with their possible continuations, they do incarnate the
consciousness, and in that sense, you can attribute consciousness to
them, it is locally useful, even if the big picture no-one has a body,
but a cloud of infinitely many bodies defined by complex "winning",
huge (in the measure sense) sets of arithmetical relations/histories.
Bruno
Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
