On Tuesday, June 23, 2015 at 11:31:26 AM UTC+10, Bruce wrote: > > meekerdb wrote: > > On 6/22/2015 5:37 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >> meekerdb wrote: > >>> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >>>> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected] > <javascript:> > >>>> <mailto:[email protected] <javascript:>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in > ordinary > >>>>> life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up > >>>>> tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I > >>>>> would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest > >>>>> continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't > >>>>> grown was made somewhere else. > >>>> > >>>> I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against > >>>> being the closest continuation. > >>>> > >>>> What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another > >>>> location and the copy moved to the original's bed? > >>> > >>> That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that > >>> asleep=mindless. Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't > >>> both the original and the copy find himself in a disjoint location > >>> incompatible with where he was before? > >> > >> I think part of the problem here is that the first-person impression > >> is taken to be definitive. Since the closest continuer theory weights > >> bodily continuity fairly highly in the metric whereby 'closest' is to > >> be determined, what happens to your body, whether or not you are > >> conscious of it, is an important consideration. > > > > It was my understanding that closest continuer was to be judged entirely > > in terms of conscious thoughts, e.g. memories. Of course these include > > memories of ones body so noticeable physical changes would count > > against, but discontinuity that was not noticeable wouldn't. Causal > > connection doesn't count because the idea is to explain everything, > > including causality in terms of consciousness. I'm not even sure the > > theory is coherent. I want to ask; continuer of what? It seems to > > intuitively rest on the idea a being or soul that *must* continue and so > > must attach to some best vehicle. > > That might be Bruno's idea -- he defines personal identity solely in > terms of memories of one's previous selves. In fact, in the way you put > it here, such a theory seems to be inherently dualist. > > But in my opinion, Bruno's definition is too narrow, and self-serving. > The closest continuer theory as discussed in the philosophical > literature on personal identity is much broader. It takes account of all > features of a person -- memories, bodily features, environment, causal > connections, values, temperament, personality, skills, etc, etc. The > definition of a 'person' is seen as irreducibly multi-dimensional. Of > course, that means that one must define a metric across those dimensions > in order to determine what is 'closest'. The metric is not absolutely > specified by the theory, and I think it can, in fact, be flexible, in > that one weighting of factors might be more appropriate in one setting > than in another. > > The point is that one should capture as much of the notion of personal > identity that we use everyday as is possible. In particular, it should > take account of those difficult cases where memory is lost or impaired > in one way or another. Bruno's definition is just too restrictive to be > of any use in the real world. >
Any use in the what?? I suppose the practical applications for "closest continuer" theory are manifold? The point is that if computationalism is true, then identity can be defined in terms of the state of a computing device (brain or its replacement device) at some level of substitution - the theory does not need to specify what that is. For the purposes of the early steps of UDA it's enough to agree that a duplication is in principle possible. This seems to follow unless you add some magical ontological property of self-ness over and above the mere physical/computational configuration of a person. Arguing about whether closest continuer is a better theory of personal identity just seems to muddy the waters AFAICT. Closest continuer seems to be a theory about semantics - like the old argument about removing planks from one ship and putting them on another - at what point does identity become exchanged? That is a silly, pointless argument to have because it's just a matter of definition. If comp is true then *something in the computational state of the observer* must account for the continuity of observer moments. That's all you need to know, > > Bruce > > > > But maybe Stathis should explain what he means by the theory. > > > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
