On 25 Jun 2015, at 02:57, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jun 24, 2015 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> neither will contain "I see Moscow and I see Washington"
Yes, and because John Clark HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and there are
now two John Clarks it would not be expected that just one interview
would settle the question of what cities John Clark saw. The first
interviewee says "I am John Clark and I see Moscow". The second
interviewee says "I am John Clark and I see Washington".
So Quentin, from the above information even a man with a room
temperature IQ such as yourself should be able to answer the
question "what cities did John Clark see?".
So you agree that we have to interview both of them to verify the
first person prediction made in helsinki. Now, in Helsinki, the guy
was able to make your little reasoning above, and so can say that both
copies will say that after the duplication, they see only one city,
and so he predicted that he will be in one city, and both interview
confirms this.
You know, betting on comp, that
1) you survive the duplication
2) All your possible continuations will have a first person experience
only among "I see only Moscow" and "I see only Washington"
3) that nobody will experience I see W and M simultaneously
It is easy to conclude, assuming comp and the default hypotheses, that
in Helsinki,the probability P("I see only one city and I have no clue
which one it will be from my first person point of view") = 1.
Pushing on the button iteratively will lead to a random sequence of
events which, in this case, matches perfectly a Bernouilli experience.
If we ask to the person in Helsinki what is the probability to feel
oneself reconstituted exactly five times in Washington when the
duplication is iterated 10 times, the answer will be given by C_10^5
1/2^10 = 0,237. The same as the probability to get exactly five girls
when doing 10 children (assuming P(girls) = P(boy)).
Again, the interview of all reconstituted persons confirms this, in an
numerically exact sort of manner.
In particular, in Helsinki, P("W & M") = 0, P("W v M") = 1. You must
here keep in mind that W and M does not represent "I am in W" in the
3-1 view, but in the 1-views (or 1-1 views, or 1-1-1 views, ... which
are all equivalent to the 1-views).
Nobody doubts that P("W & M") = 1 in the 3-1 views, but that is not
the answer to the question asked, which is about the future first
personal experiences (which exist(s) by comp).
OK?
Then, up to step 6, the answers follows as much easily. For the step
7, some people have difficulties, and I do have version of it
decompose in finer steps, but I have never used here, as most people
understand.
Step 8 is objectively more subtle, as it is needed to understand that
arithmetic emulates the computations and is not just describing the
computations.
Then for AUDA, all you need is the belief in the following
propositions, and nothing else (with comp in the background at the
meta-level, for the motivation of the definition):
Predicate calculus with identity +
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
Or even much less (apparently), like
Identity calculus +
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
That's all. In such theory, I can define the Löbian Beweisbar, and
using the usual math I can study the semantics and distinguish what
the Löbian machine can prove and not prove. Eventually, thanks to a
theorem by Solovay, the abstract persons get an interesting theology,
in Plato's sense, and it include physics, and the propositional logics
of observability have been derived, and fits well with quantum
mechanics.
The sophisticateness of the notion of universal machine/number leads
to generalizing Everett's embedding of the physicist in the "physical
wave" to an embedding of the mathematician in the mathematical
reality. With comp, the embedding is partially constructive. Both the
constructive and non-constructive part of reality have non trivial
mathematical structures.
Basically, there is no statements of mine which is not a direct or
indirect consequence of Kleene's second recursion theorem, and its
formalizability in arithmetic.
There is a good recreative introduction to the main logic I use, G, by
Raymond Smullyan: "Forever Undecided". And its "How to Mock a Mocking
Bird" presents very well the first and second recursion principles
using combinators.
Could you please stop being negative toward people, it is boring, and
only defeat your point. It is an invalid implicit authoritative ad
hominem argument.
UDA is AUDA for human babies. AUDA is UDA for universal machine/number
babies.
Bruno
> If you could quit the list with your horses that would be
really cool
You make it clear that if I quit the list it would make you very
happy, therefore I will not quite the list. You're a lousy
psychologist, you should have said you'd cry like a baby if I quit
the list.
John K Clark
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