Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Jun 2015, at 09:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:05, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 16:35, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
John Clark wrote:
After they diverge they will still both identify with
the same
person, John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will identify
with
each other, and both would consider their life to be more
important than that other fellow who happened to have
the same
name. Before they diverged things would be very
different, there
would be no other fellow, there would only be one.
That is an eminently sensible statement. It accords well
with the
"closest continuer" theory of personal identity. According
to that
theory, if there is a tie for being the *closest* continuer,
as in
this case, the initial person does not continue, but two new
persons
are created. If the duplicate is identical to the original
in every
respect, there is only one person -- identity of
indiscernibles and
all that. JC is correct, there would be no 'other fellow'.
Once the copy diverges from the original, there are two
different
(new) persons. They may share some memories, but so what?
People
often share memories. Neither is the original person.
The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both
copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong
in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the
origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a
bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy
was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy
would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy
was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer
until the 0.1% copy was revived.
How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a
tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two new
persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the
level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we
cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning
restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big
toe is not a relevant difference.
It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and
better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but
improved.
What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost
instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in
these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, then
there is no duplication!
Then there is new person all the time, and no more any prediction could
be done or related to the world.
You have overlooked the context of this conversation, as has Stathis. My
starting point was the closest continuer account of personal identity.
There is no problem in this account with the day-to-day changes in every
person. There are problems only in these duplication cases. The simplest
resolution in that situation is that there is no closest continuer, so
two new persons are created. This is especially evident when the copying
of the original is destructive.
But we have agreed to link the person identity used for personal
prediction to the one having the relevant memory,
As I have said before, this is your account of personal identity. And it
is self-serving -- designed to give the answer you want. You ignore all
the problems associated with personal memory and personal recollections
of past happenings. There are enough people who think they are Napoleon,
or the reincarnation of Alexander the Great, to throw your theory into
disrepair.
Also, I have personal experience of a person with brain damage who has
great difficulties with remembering things. And frequently this problem
manifests itself in the form of false memories -- the person is
convinced that something or the other happened, or that they did
something, when I know quite well, and can demonstrate by external
evidence, that these 'memories' are false -- confabulations, indeed.
First person accounts of anything are inherently unreliable and must be
checked against external objective (interpersonal agreed) evidence. You
build you theory on very shaky grounds.
which exist by the
existence of the duplication level (assumed in mechanism). In step 7, we
don't need multiple copies, as the many "preparation" in arithmetic are
enough to get the global FPI (we assume comp).
You argue against comp, but Joihn Clark assumes comp (and accept steps
0, 1, and 2).
You keep asking for evidence against comp. I continue to provide it, but
you just ignore any contrary accounts.
Bruce
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