On 22 Jun 2015, at 09:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:05, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 16:35, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
John Clark wrote:
After they diverge they will still both identify with
the same
person, John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will
identify
with
each other, and both would consider their life to be
more
important than that other fellow who happened to have
the same
name. Before they diverged things would be very
different, there
would be no other fellow, there would only be one.
That is an eminently sensible statement. It accords well
with the
"closest continuer" theory of personal identity. According
to that
theory, if there is a tie for being the *closest*
continuer,
as in
this case, the initial person does not continue, but two
new
persons
are created. If the duplicate is identical to the original
in every
respect, there is only one person -- identity of
indiscernibles and
all that. JC is correct, there would be no 'other fellow'.
Once the copy diverges from the original, there are two
different
(new) persons. They may share some memories, but so
what? People
often share memories. Neither is the original person.
The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both
copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong
in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the
origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller
and a
bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy
was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy
would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy
was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer
until the 0.1% copy was revived.
How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a
tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two
new
persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the
level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact --
we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning
restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your
big
toe is not a relevant difference.
It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and
better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but
improved.
What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost
instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in
these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine,
then there is no duplication!
Then there is new person all the time, and no more any prediction
could be done or related to the world.
But we have agreed to link the person identity used for personal
prediction to the one having the relevant memory, which exist by the
existence of the duplication level (assumed in mechanism). In step 7,
we don't need multiple copies, as the many "preparation" in arithmetic
are enough to get the global FPI (we assume comp).
You argue against comp, but Joihn Clark assumes comp (and accept steps
0, 1, and 2).
Bruno
Bruce
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