Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:05, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 22 June 2015 at 16:35, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> John Clark wrote: After they diverge they will still both identify with the same person, John Clark, HOWEVER they no longer will identify with each other, and both would consider their life to be more important than that other fellow who happened to have the same name. Before they diverged things would be very different, there would be no other fellow, there would only be one. That is an eminently sensible statement. It accords well with the "closest continuer" theory of personal identity. According to that theory, if there is a tie for being the *closest* continuer, as in this case, the initial person does not continue, but two new persons are created. If the duplicate is identical to the original in every respect, there is only one person -- identity of indiscernibles and all that. JC is correct, there would be no 'other fellow'. Once the copy diverges from the original, there are two different (new) persons. They may share some memories, but so what? People often share memories. Neither is the original person. The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer until the 0.1% copy was revived. How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two new persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at thelevel of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloningrestrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big toe is not a relevant difference.It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but improved.
What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, then there is no duplication!
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