On 01 Jul 2015, at 18:38, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> The heart of the matter is I can't give an answer to a
gibberish question.
> How could the question be gibberish when computationalism
make it easy to understand. You are in Helsinki. OK. I hope
this use of "you" is not ambiguous.
Wishing does not make it so. Does "you" mean John Clark who is
currently experiencing Helsinki, or does "you" mean John Clark who
remembers experiencing Helsinki?
We have agreed that they are the same person.
> And you will remain alive in the duplication experience (you
agreed on this)
I agreed if "you" means John Clark, but not if "you" means the man
currently experiencing Helsinki because according to the thought
experiment in the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki.
See above.
> and you are the guy, and will remain the guy, with that
memory of your time in Helsinki. So no ambiguity.
OK good that is not ambiguous and is clear as a bell, "you" are
the guys who remember being John Clark the Helsinki Man, and so
"you" will indeed survive.
Good.
> How would you (that you, still in Helsinki) evaluate the
probability or plausibility that you will experience, after pushing
on the button:
1) opening a door of a reconstitution box?
0%, "you" will not open "a door", but there is a 100% chance
"you" will open 2 doors.
That is logically impossible. No John Calrk will ever feel to open 2
doors and see two cities from any of the first person experience
available at that moment with that protocol. "You" will open two doors
only from the perspective of an outsider. That is not the first person
perspective of John Clark, which is what the question was all about.
The answer was 100%, as the diaries will confirmed.
2) opening a door of a reconstitution box and see one and only one
city?
0%
No. the question are on the first person experience, and after the
duplication, both confirms seeing only one city. The answer is 100%.
You continue to give the 3-1 view, when the question is asked about
the 1-view, or equiavlently, what is written in the personal diary
transported in the box.
3) opening the door of a reconstitution box and see two cities at
once?
100%
Then none of JCW nor JCM needs any means (phone, mobile) to
communicate, and you are pertending that duplicate brain get
telepathic power, where comp + the protocole makes this false. The
brain/computer reconstituted are mechanically independent.
> Note that by definition of first person experience, "seeing
two cities at once" means literally being a person [blah blah]
STOP RIGHT THERE! If as Bruno Marchal just said "you" means
the guys who remember being John Clark the Helsinki Man then after
the duplication there is not "a person" who fits that description,
there are "persons" who fit that description.
Exactly, so we have to look at both 1-diaries, and both contains "I
see only one door and one city behind"
If Bruno Marchal no longer likes that definition of "you" then
change it,
I keep that definition. No problem at all, as long as you read all (or
a significant sample of) the first person diaries obtained after the
duplication(s).
or better yet just stop using those goddamn ambiguous personal
pronouns and use the referent instead.
It is as much ambiguous, if you confuse 1-views and 3-1 views, and the
pronouns or the referent are both made non-ambiguous when we
distinguish the 1-views and the 3-1-views.
Bruno
John K Clark
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