On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my
computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other.
You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a
party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and
communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum
between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the
two "original" persons have become two persons, having each its
unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) =
1, and P(W & M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see
some other city in the direct way of the first person experience.
It follows from physics.
We don't know that. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to
implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then
we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/
mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we
have to introduce.
But does it follow from UD computations?
It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable.
Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig
deeper in computer science.
Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you
were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet
has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the
nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days.
Bruno
Brent
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