Le 21 juil. 2015 01:05, "chris peck" <[email protected]> a écrit : > > >> the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". > > nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied. He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will be right. > > Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W & M) = 1.
Then under MWI, P(spin up & spin down) = 1, if you agree then fine. Quentin > > ________________________________ > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark > Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200 > > > > On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote: > >> On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> > T >>> he probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. >> >> >> If you want that statement to be true then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, > > > > Not at all. "he" means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". > > >> >>> > >>> Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. >> >> >> OK, "he" will say one city, Moscow. And "he" will say one city, Washington. > > > In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. > > > > >> So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then "he" saw 2 cities. > > > Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). > > > > >> If you want that statement to be false then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, > > > On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W & M) = 0. > > I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. > > > > > >> you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. >> >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, > > > Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. > > >> >>> >>> > >>> From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, >> >> >> If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to "him" after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, > > > The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. > > > >> >> >> >> > >> The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience >> >> I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. > > > Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the "W v M" expectation, and both confirms "W & M" is never felt. The "W & M" does not even make sense for a first person content of self-localization. "W & M" is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. > > >> Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > > Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the "W or M" is confirmed, and the "W & M" is refuted. For both of them. > > Bruno > > >> >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, >> >> John K Clark >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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