Quentin >> Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI?
we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same sketch with you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you so much? David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it this way with regards to Schrodinger's Cat: "We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many Worlds Theory. So the theory seems to be a theory which involves deterministic branching: if I ask what should I expect in the future the answer is I should with 100% certainty expect to be a version of David who sees the cat alive and in addition I should expect with 100% certainty to be a version of David who sees the cat dead." What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come it? Im not brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that he doesn't take the Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem will go away by pretending it doesn't exist. Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200 Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, "chris peck" <[email protected]> a écrit : > > Quentin > > > >> Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so > >> probability should also be one > > Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability > coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were > difficult to marry... Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the probabilities, right? Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? Quentin > > ________________________________ > Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark > To: [email protected] > From: [email protected] > Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 > > > On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer >>>>> screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. >>>> >>>> >>>> You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in >>>> Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but >>>> unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse >>>> the limbic system, by comp, the two "original" persons have become two >>>> persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, >>>> and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0, as no one can open door in >>>> Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person >>>> experience. >>> >>> >>> It follows from physics. >> >> >> We don't know that. > > > Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: "You will > need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington." > >> We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally >> universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the >> computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to >> be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. > > > But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different > locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because > their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it > is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis > of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. > > Brent > >> >> >> >>> But does it follow from UD computations? >> >> >> It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. >> Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in >> computer science. >> >> Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were >> OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also >> some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about >> step 3 that we can hear those days. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
