On 23 Jul 2015, at 13:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 juil. 2015 09:24, "chris peck" <[email protected]> a
écrit :
>
> Quentin
>
>
> >> Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5
under MWI?
>
> we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same
sketch with you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you
so much?
No he did not. He pretends probabilities do have meaning in MWI.
When he says 0.5 with his bet he ignores he is entangled with the
measurement apparatus and duplicated with it, with one john winning
and one losinf his bet.
Exactly.
The deny of the FPI has been shown now equivalent with the deny of the
use of probability in QM (beyond having be shown inconsistent per se,
or based on the 1-3 confusion).
Case close. (Normally).
Bruno
>
> David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it
this way with regards to Schrodinger's Cat:
>
> "We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many
Worlds Theory. So the theory seems to be a theory which involves
deterministic branching: if I ask what should I expect in the future
the answer is I should with 100% certainty expect to be a version of
David who sees the cat alive and in addition I should expect with
100% certainty to be a version of David who sees the cat dead."
>
> What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come
it? Im not brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that
he doesn't take the Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem
will go away by pretending it doesn't exist.
>
>
> ________________________________
> Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200
> Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark
> From: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
>
>
>
> Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, "chris peck" <[email protected]> a
écrit :
> >
> > Quentin
> >
> >
> > >> Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all
results, so probability should also be one
> >
> > Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of
probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed
determinism and chance were difficult to marry...
>
> Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders
the probabilities, right?
>
> Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5
under MWI?
>
> Quentin
> >
> > ________________________________
> > Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
> > To: [email protected]
> > From: [email protected]
> > Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700
> >
> >
> > On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my
computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow,
and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and
communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum
between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two
"original" persons have become two persons, having each its unique
experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and
P(W & M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other
city in the direct way of the first person experience.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> It follows from physics.
> >>
> >>
> >> We don't know that.
> >
> >
> > Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection:
"You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a
party in Washington."
> >
> >> We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement
locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we
arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/
mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we
have to introduce.
> >
> >
> > But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at
different locations do not experience both locations - their minds
are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an
assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of
mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might
expect the duplicates to share one mind.
> >
> > Brent
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> But does it follow from UD computations?
> >>
> >>
> >> It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is
testable.
> >> Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to
dig deeper in computer science.
> >>
> >> Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I
think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think
Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more
intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days.
> >>
> >> Bruno
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Brent
> >>>
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> >>
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >>
> >>
> >>
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