On 21 Jul 2015, at 00:05, chris peck wrote:
>> the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of
his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be
"seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M".
nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences.
Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first
person experience.
I guess you mean, he can expect to have, seen from outside, two
mutually exclusive experiences.
So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between
the 1-1 and 3-1 views.
He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the
feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both
experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then
he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to
Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one?
To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price:
going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-annihilation,
and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars.
"--No problem" he said, I expect to live both experiences (like you
say). OK, so he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars.
But the "original" on Earth is disappointed, because when he opened
the door, in front on me on Earth, he is still on Earth (obviously).
He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that "yes" his copy is on
Mars. That did not make him happy, as he realized that the one staying
on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. He can
intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that
doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation as he feel to be only
on Earth, and will never got that mars direct first person experience
he was wishing for. He understand now that the duplication does not
guaranty the direct experience of the copies, but of only one of them.
If he repeat that experience, the probability that he stays on Earth
will be made small, but never null. Repeating it a lot, the
probability tends to 1 - epsilon. But on Erath, we can dialog directly
only with the "original", and he can only get more and more
frustrated, as he is the one staying on Earth, despite the proba was
epsilon.
This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I
or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied.
His body and his first person experience are multiplied in the 3-1 view.
His body is multiplied in the 1-views.
But his first person experience is not multiplied in the 1-1 views.
That would lead to the exoerience of two mutually exclusive
experience, and ... see above.
He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these
experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he
is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this
situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And
he will be right.
Let us read the diary. In Helsinki he wrote "I expect to have both
experiences in the first person sense".
In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow, and so conclude that he was
wrong (even if he sees a video showing that he has successfully been
reconstituted in Washington; but he cannot feel the W experience, and
that is thus not part of his first experience of seeing a city (the
other one is seen only through a video).
Consequently, P(W || M) = 1.
P(W or M) ? Yes, that is correct.
P(W & M) = 1.
That is correct in the 3-1 view, but the question was on the 1-views
themselves, and nobody can have the *experience* of two mutually
exclusive experiences. As even Clark admits, there are two streams of
consciousness, and as I explain, the question concerns the content of
the experiences, not the content that we can attribute to them
intellectually.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200
On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing*
one and only one city is one.
If you want that statement to be true then "he" can't mean
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have
to change what "he" means to something else. But of course
ICT1PWT3P,
Not at all. "he" means the guy who remember being the man in
Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his
expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content,
which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M".
> Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication
has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who
was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have
seen behind the door.
OK, "he" will say one city, Moscow. And "he" will say one city,
Washington.
In the third person description of the first person experience, not
in the content of each of those experience.
So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then "he" saw 2 cities.
Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which
is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked.
Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head
monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already
agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...).
If you want that statement to be false then "he" can't mean
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki,
On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them,
so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory,
and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W & M) = 0.
I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man,
but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism.
you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else.
But of course ICT1PWT3P,
Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine.
> From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate,
If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to "him"
after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion
will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view
has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P,
The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1
view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever
get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the
answer is rather easy.
> The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing
the copies, about their experience
I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute
the expectation, two are required.
Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the
"W v M" expectation, and both confirms "W & M" is never felt. The "W
& M" does not even make sense for a first person content of self-
localization. "W & M" is evacuated immediately once we understand
that the question was about those first person experience.
Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything
to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self.
Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt
after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness
of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the "W or M" is
confirmed, and the "W & M" is refuted. For both of them.
Bruno
But of course ICT1PWT3P,
John K Clark
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