On 21 Jul 2015, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2015, at 00:05, chris peck wrote:
>> the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation
of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can
only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M".
nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences.
Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first
person experience.
I guess you mean, he can expect to have, seen from outside, two
mutually exclusive experiences.
Of course that is tautologically true, by definition of "mutually
exclusive". But are the experiences mutually exclusive?
It is the experiences which are exclusive.
You've argued that consciousness has no location in spacetime.
The pure 1-consciousness, or 1-1-consciousness, or 1-1-1
consciousness, ...
But when people say that their consciousness will be implemented in
both cities, they attribute consciousness to person which are locally
incarnated/implemented relatively to them (in what will be called
normal environment). And comp reduces the mind-body problem to a
justification of the existence of such normal environment (and that is
solved by the quantum logics).
Consciousness is not localizable, but relative consciousness of other
people can, a priori, by sharing the normal computations with others.
It is the same with multi-user video game. You will locate you enemi
in this or that virtual city, and use virtual planes or rockets to get
there, without knowing that your enemy is played by your neighbor, and
both are played by infinities of computations in arithmetic.
Mathematically, it is enough to understand why incompeleteness entails
the difference of logoc and mathematics in all the points of view (the
3-I logics are G and G*, the 1_I logic is given by S4Grz, the
observable is given by S4Grz1, or X1*, or Z1*etc.)
So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer
screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other.
You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a
party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate
by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two
brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two "original"
persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience.
That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0,
as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the
direct way of the first person experience.
You can modify the protocol to make this or other statements false,
but not in a way relevant for the pursuit of the reasoning. It is
supposed that the W and M guy does not got a new corpus callosum! It
is part of the default hypotheses. In step 4, the delay prevents such
critics at once, showing the non relevance of adding machinery to help
disputing the exclusion of the first person experience. Replace the
cities by hell and heaven, if that helps.
Bruno
Brent
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