On 23 Jul 2015, at 21:44, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the
duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he
(at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because
although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still
just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and
make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not;
> Same thing with MWI,
No not the same, both involve duplication but after that the
similarities end.
Not in a relevant way as far as the probabilities on the first person
experience is concerned.
> I remind you however you are that you are duplicated along
the measurement apparatus.
Yes.
> So who's you who make the bet?
In MWI "You" is the only thing that the laws of physics allow
Quentin Anciaux to observe that is organized in a Johnkclarkian way;
that is the thing that will give Quentin Anciaux money if the bet is
lost and that is the thing Quentin Anciaux will have to give money
to if the bet is won. With duplicating chamber stuff if the bet was
"you will see Moscow" I don't know how to resolve the bet because I
don't know who "you" is; maybe Quentin would have to give the Moscow
Man $5 and the Washington Man would have to give Quentin $5, but
that seems rather silly. What would be the point of Quentin Anciaux
making such a bet?
To make the bet, the one who bet must accompany the experiencer. This
illustrate well the notion of first person plural, and show that both
in Comp and in Everett we can use Dutsch-book definition of
probability (as opposed to a frequency interpretation).
You and I are in Helsinki, and we will both enter the annihilation-
duplication box. Your bet is P(W & M) = 1, and so put your money on "W
& M". I bet on "W or M". We are both annihilated and reconstituted in
both cities.
In W, you and me, realize that we live "W and ~M", which implies "W or
M", I win, you loose.
In M, you and me, realize that we live "M and ~W", which implies "W or
M", I win, you loose.
Conclusion: P(W or M) = P(W xor M) = 1. P(W and M) = 0.
No ambiguity in pronouns at all, you and me remain the guys who
remember our lives, including our visit of Helsinki and the button
pushing.
You can use this to explain how Everett-QM saves, empirically, the
idealism of computationalism from solipism.
Bruno
John K Clark
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