On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:38, smitra wrote:

You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment,

That is dangerous talk, but i see what you mean.


which includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication experiments, so the string of the "W"'s and "M"'should be included in the definition of "you".

That is implied by the definition: content of the diary taken by the experiencer in the teleportation box. OK.




You can also invent a machine that creates a consciousness that has false memories of having been Bruno and also John Clark in the past, but such that these memories are inconsistent with each other. E.g. it has the memory of having been at Brussels, but also in New York at the same time.

But there is not problem here if you just take the formal description of any conscious being as defining its personal identity.

Yes, but usually we prefer to avoid the term "conscious" too early. In fact, I agree on this last sentence, but only because we recover that when we translate the 3p self by the arithmetical provability (Gödel's beweisbar) predicate "[]A", and the 1p self by the conjunction of the provability and truth ("[]p & p"). Here we get an explanation of a difficulty which is hidden in step 3 (but withoit making the reasoning invalid as it is not used thanks to the 3p definition of the 1p), and which is that the 1p cannot be defined by the machine. This is coherent with introspection, with duplication, with the fact that "consciousness" is not definable (like truth), and with the greek notion of inner God (which does play the role of the universal first- person, the one described by the logic of []p & p (S4Grz1).

Thanks for the suggestion, but I am not sure that any help can change John Clark's behavior. I am not sure he believes himself that his prose is related to the subject.

Bruno






Saibal


On 06-08-2015 11:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
​>> ​But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the
other.
​> ​Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of
information,
​No new information has been received. Long before the duplication
button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would
receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new
information was generated. ​
You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the
copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and
looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information.
So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information.
Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself.
But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both
confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of "pushing
on the button and deciding which cities is behind" is always either W
or M, and never both.
​> ​You
​[​
​C​hris
​P​eck
​] ​seem to just persist ignoring the question like John
Clark.
​Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore;
there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a
referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a
question mark at the very end. ​A question needs more than a
question mark.
The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp,
without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both. "W &
M" is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe
the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience
that they directly live (which was what the question is all about).
Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you
avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you
keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its
subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation
and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point
meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both
copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a
doppelganger in the other city.
Bruno
​ John K Clark​
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