On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> >> Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in >> complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal >> pronoun "you". >> >> > > We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than one > person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the name or in > the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference. > In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the difference between *THE* 1p and the 3p difference and the difference between *THE* 1-1p and the 3- 1 p difference ? And whose "1p" is it anyway? > > > you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p, > In short, YCT1PAT3P. And it's true, John Clark is very confused about which 1p Bruno Marchal is talking about, although probably not as confused as Bruno Marchal. > > as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all experiences. > John Clark is profoundly uninterested in "comp" and does not believe that "comp" can explain anything at all. > >> >> Well now that's all very nice but >> John Clark still has one question, >> t >> here are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > > > > > The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively, > Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things. But why is this even relevant? The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively *NOTHING *to do with it. That's why trying to define personal identity by looking to the future rather than the past is just nuts. > > we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man is the > Helsinki man. > What day is it....lets see... it's Wednesday, so yes today we agree on that. Tomorrow we won't. > > w > > e have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's important to remember that t he Washington man is *NOT* the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future. > > > which explains why the H-man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well > defined in H) will live the W or the M experience. > The only uncertainty is who "he" is. If "he" is the guy experiencing Helsinki today then "he" will experience *NEITHER *Washington nor Moscow tomorrow. However if "he" is the guy who remembers experiencing Helsinki today (or if "he" is Bruno Marchal) then "he" will experience Washington *AND* Moscow tomorrow. > > I > n Helsinki, we decide with a coin between the alternative described just > below, but we don't let you know the result: > - tail : you are duplicated in M and W > - head: you are not duplicated, but teleported to one of the city (also > chosen with a coin) > This time John Clark would have less information to work with so not surprisingly John Clark would not know what to expect, maybe one city maybe two. Not that expectations, correct or incorrect, have any bearing on the question at hand. > > So you don't know if you will be simply teleported in one of the two city, > or be duplicated in both, once you push the button. > The question is: do you think that without external clue you could know > which one of the alternative has been realized after pushing the button? > Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
