On 02 Aug 2015, at 18:44, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 1, 2015 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> Well of course it doesn't determine THE 1p because in a
world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as THE
1p.
> Then you die with the simple teleportation.
Then who will die in the simple teleportation?
You, when you are in Helsinki. You agreed that before the duplication,
this is not ambiguous.
If Bruno is unable to give a coherent meaning to the personal
pronoun "you", and by now it's pretty clear
Rhetorical trick. You forget that you and Peck are the only one having
a problem here. None of any member of the many jury having judge this
work has have any problem with this.
that Bruno can not, then Bruno should stop using that word when
trying to tackle issues like personal identity or the unique feeling
of self.
So, to be clear, this contradict your own admission that "you" is
unambiguous before the duplication. Then to get the simple answer, all
you need is to keep in mind that it is not abaout the lmocation of
your bodies, but about the first person experience that you will live
(again, with that non ambiguous definition of identity that we have
agree on).
>> And who is "you"? The 1p that you will live in
. And who is "you" again? The person that has the 1p. And who has
this 1p? You. And round and round we go.
> Lol
Yes it is sorta funny, and the funniest part is that Bruno is
laughing at the very absurdity of Bruno Marchal's theory.
> Of course there is a "the", even two, but only one is
avaiblae for both copies, and that is there is indetermination on
the outcome of the experience.
Before the duplication there would be no uncertainty I (this is
before duplication so that pronoun can be used), would know that in
the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man
would see Washington. What more is needed, what exactly is it that
is supposed to be uncertain? Please please don't say it's uncertain
what *you* will see from *the* 1p.
You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after
pushing the button. If there is no uncertainty, give the prediction. W
and M has been refuted already, and your comment on that was just that
the 1p/3p was ... pee pee (your term). That is just unintelligible.
> The question was "what do you expect to live when you will
push on the button"
That depends on who "you" is. John Clark has already explained
what John Clark would expect; what Bruno Marchal would expect John
Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of
consciousness or the unique feeling of self.
> Let us count the subjective experiences available: two.
Correct, and if Bruno Marchal has been duplicated then Bruno
Marchal can experience both of them.
A couple of person is not a person. You are just playing with word. If
you expect to live both, then the simple verification (reading of the
diaries in W and M) refutes your prediction.
> But you have agreed that they are incompatible,
As explained over and over and over again, the Washington Man and
the Moscow Man are incompatible with each other but they are NOT
incompatible with both being Bruno Marchal.
of course. This follows from the definition, but does not address the
question of what you can expect to live from the first person pov.
Are they incompatible with both being *you*? That is not a
question, that is just a sequence of ASCII characters with a
question mark at the end.
> you know that for any first person experience pov, it will be
like only one of the outcome has been made available.
Yes but given the fact that TWO first person experiences have
been made available and they are both Bruno Marchal's that is not
a problem.
No, it is an explanation of why there is a first person indeterminacy.
There will be two first person experiences, but each one excludes the
others. The W-guy and the M-guy both agree that P(W & M) = 1 was
wrong, and that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1.
You persist faking to ignore the question. That is what is pretty
clear for everybody in and out this list.
Bruno
John K Clark
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