@ Bruno >> You forget that you and Peck are the only one having a problem here.
Im not sure thats true. True, there is a fair amount of uncritical support, but from what I see people kind of give you the benefit of the doubt at step 3 agreeing that there is something wishy washy about it. People kind of accept there would be a continuity of consciousness from H to W and from H to M, and they believe that is the important thing, then they blindly succer into the idea that because W and M only see one city this has some baring on how H should calculate his 'expectancies'. They make a fundamental and understandable error, and you push them very hard to make that error. The truth is that if you knew you were going to be duplicated you would bet on W very differently than if you know you have been duplicated and havent opened the door yet. Knowing you have been duplicated is a very different situation from knowing you are going to be. I can imagine my subjective view evolving seamlessly from H to W, and also imagine my view evolving seamlessly from H to M. But to ask which one will be me asks me to suppose that one evolution over the other is THE valid evolution of the subjective view. But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other. So to bet one which one I will be is a stupid thing to do. You try to get away from that fact by torturing semantics. You ask 'which one will you live to be' and what have you, but really, the question is just silly. BUT, They are both *A* valid evolution. So it is possible to talk sensibly about them both being valid evolutions of a 1P view and that H can expect both. You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of M, and clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE 1p of M are THE 1p of H. Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400 Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again From: [email protected] To: [email protected] On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark: 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". >>> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person experience >> There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to refer to it. Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, there are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing the button. >> Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? That depends on who "you" is. John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. And John Clark would also know which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington. What Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? - I expect to die. - I expect to feel myself in two cities at once.- I expect to feel myself in only one city. I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would further expect that from *THE* 1P John Clark will not experience anything at all. John Clark would not expect *THE* 1P to exist at all because John Clark expects John Clark to be duplicated. What Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation only Bruno Marchal knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion We only agree on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, on the other days we disagree except for Sunday, on Sunday I don't know if we agree or disagree. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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