On 05 Aug 2015, at 02:13, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
>> You forget that you and Peck are the only one having a problem
here.
Im not sure thats true. True, there is a fair amount of uncritical
support,
This is just insulting the participants of the list, or the members of
the jury of my phd, or of the price, and the whole academy.
but from what I see people kind of give you the benefit of the doubt
at step 3 agreeing that there is something wishy washy about it.
What is wishy washy? You attribute thought to other people?
I think you are just doing rhetorical arguments, to give the idea that
there is something controversial. But that is a myth. It is
contrevresial for people who eiminate consciousness and persons from
the scientific discourse, probably because they know since 1500 years
that their power is nsustained by that systemic lie.
You talk like a Aistotelian who jates the idea that Arstotelism is a
theory, an hypothseis, something science asks us the duty to doubt
about.
People kind of accept there would be a continuity of consciousness
from H to W and from H to M,
That follows from step 0, the dinition of comp, and the preceding steps.
and they believe that is the important thing, then they blindly
succer into the idea that because W and M only see one city this has
some baring on how H should calculate his 'expectancies'.
Assuming mechanism, it is hard to see how they could avoid this.
They make a fundamental and understandable error, and you push them
very hard to make that error.
Nice, so you have see an error. I am listeling.
The truth is that ....
Of course, if you know the truth, there is not much we can discuss
about, isn't?
if you knew you were going to be duplicated you would bet on W very
differently than if you know you have been duplicated and havent
opened the door yet. Knowing you have been duplicated is a very
different situation from knowing you are going to be.
I use indeed, explcitly the following principle; if today I can bet
with certainty that I will be uncertain about the outcome of some
experience tomorrow, then I am today uncertain about that outcome.
But that principle is derivable from the notion of personal identity
on which Clark and me agree. I let you this as an exercise.
But if you don't believe in that principle, can you give me the best
prediction of anyone undergoing a self-duplication and asked about
what expect to live, and the means of verification?
I can imagine my subjective view evolving seamlessly from H to W,
and also imagine my view evolving seamlessly from H to M.
Good. That is indeed the correct 3-1p description, which is, basically
the protocol given. But we don't ask about this, we ask about what to
expect to live, in, and from, the subjective side.
But to ask which one will be me asks me to suppose that one
evolution over the other is THE valid evolution of the subjective
view.
Of course NOT.
"THE" is valid for BOTH: it is the experience that they are indeed
living after the duplication has been done.
Both (W & ~M) and (M & ~W) will be consistent continuation, but the
"the" is due to the fact that fetre the duplicaation is done,
subjectively there has been a bit of information given, and so, FOR
BOTH, the use of the term "the" in Helsinki makes sense. No one will
pretend to be the "truly original", but they will still agrre that the
reconstitutions in the different environment has given a first person
selection.
But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other.
Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of
information, exactly like someone measuring a quibit in the maximally
complementary base.
So to bet one which one I will be is a stupid thing to do.
Of course not, see what I explain just above.
You try to get away from that fact by torturing semantics.
Not at all, I use simple definition, and only crackpot pretend have
seen a mistake here, and have never been able to convince anybody on
this, except those who does not read argument and follows authorities,
which in the "perish or publish" type of "modern research" is very
often mandatory.
No semantics have been harmed in the doing of the demonstration.
You ask 'which one will you live to be' and what have you, but
really, the question is just silly.
This is ridiculous and comp proves that all copies will refute this.
BUT, They are both *A* valid evolution.
In the 31--p. Sure. That's part of the protocol.
But in the 1-p, they get both *THE* valid evolution they were
predicting about (the one they get).
So it is possible to talk sensibly about them both being valid
evolutions of a 1P view and that H can expect both.
Intellectually, but when they get both, they still live only one of
them, as they both confirm.
You seem to just persist ignoring the question like John Clark. We
don't ask an intellectual description, which indeed follows trivially
from the protocols, we ask about you you expect to live, and all
copies, they get that unique experience that they were not able to
predict in advance. They guy who get the sequence (in the iterated
duuplication) WWWWMWWMMWW say: "no I could not have predicted that,"
and most people get something similar.
You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of
M, and clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE
1p of M are THE 1p of H.
You continue to use the Leibiz identity rule where eeven John Clark is
aware this makes no sense.
Bruno
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with
this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the
following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark:
1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you".
> We have explained to you that the key is in the difference
between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.
Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no
difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark"
for the personal pronoun "you".
>>> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but
about the first person experience
>> There are two first person experiences, which one is
Bruno talking about?
> We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact
same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the
hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience
of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to
that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from
the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1-
pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes
sense to refer to it.
Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one
question, there are two first person experiences, which one is
Bruno talking about?
> You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live
after pushing the button.
>> Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said
clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would
know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the
Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark]
also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get
his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons
from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John
Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of
consciousness or the unique feeling of self.
> You make my point by avoiding the question again and again
and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically
the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The
question is what do you expect to live as first person experience?
That depends on who "you" is. John Clark would expect that
in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man
would see Washington. And John Clark would also know
which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from
Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington.
What Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares
because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing
to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of
self.
> You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question
is what do you expect to live as first person experience?
- I expect to die.
- I expect to feel myself in two cities at once.
- I expect to feel myself in only one city.
I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that
tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect
that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would
further expect that from *THE* 1P John Clark will not experience
anything at all. John Clark would not expect *THE* 1P to exist at
all because John Clark expects John Clark to be duplicated. What
Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation only Bruno Marchal
knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have
anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique
feeling of self.
> I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion
We only agree on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, on the other days
we disagree except for Sunday, on Sunday I don't know if we agree or
disagree.
John K Clark
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