On 12 Aug 2015, at 02:46, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view!
> We have this since the beginning.
That explains your profound confusion.
> You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy,
Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before
the door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to
experience different things there is only one person so naturally
there is only one first person view; after the door is opened
there are many persons and a corresponding number of views.
Yes, but none can be lived simultaneously, so when you do the
prediction on your future personal experience you need to replace the
(3-1p) AND by a XOR, as you have agreed that the M and W experiences
are incompatible from each 1p view available.
> but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as
you agree they are incompatible.
Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as "the 1-
view".
I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies. It is
simpler in the iterated case, as it shows better a natural confusion
between 3-1 views and 1-views. See below for more.
Read this with the mind state "maybe I miss something", and not "let
me try to find a critics".
>> your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by >
who?
> By anyone,
By any third party, in other words the third party view. I
don't understand the difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view.
That is why, I usually use only the 3p terminology. I use "3-1" for
people like you who insist that they talk about the 1-views of the
copies, when saying P(W & M) = 1. But to ascribe an 1-view to a number
of persons different from oneself-or not, it can only be when we
ascribe 1p views to third person object of description, that is, to
other than oneself subjectively, as opposed to the 1p person that we
can live (and can have direct local access to memory). So 3p is a 3p
description of the locus or object to which we can ascribe a first
person point of view, intellectually, that means without living them,
like both copies can do for their doppelgangers, or like we do more or
less for our human fellows.
3-1p belongs to the 3p description. Consciousness, soul, first person
does not admit 3p description, but can be ascribed to 3p object, like
a body or a machine. 3-1p is just the case where we describe in the 3p
way, first person attributed to other people (including oneself). We
use I for both in Natural Language, and someone can say before the
duplication that:
I can predict that tomorrow I will be in Washington and I will be in
Moscow" but I can predict that tomorrow I will feel being in
Washington" or "I will feel being in Moscow".
Of course, you can always step back, and say, no "I will feel to be in
Washington" and "I will will to be in Moscow", as you did sometimes
agoo, and precisely that is the 3-1 versus 1 confusion.
At least you avoided, contrary to my prediction (!), to fall in the
trap of the 3-3-1 versus 1 confusion.
The complete disambiguition is:
Tomorrow 3-1-I will be in the two cities, but 1-I will feel being in
only one of them.
>> If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the
3 view,
> No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct
access to an 1-view.
If we had such access there would be no difference between
objective and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since
we can't a different name is required and it's called, in your
homemade terminology, "3p view". And I still don't understand the
difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view. Do you?
> So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner
of the diary,
In other words the 3 view.
> which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view,
In other words the 3 view.
> but not necessarily our own.
In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still
don't understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1
view.
> 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.
Aka the 3 view.
> Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That
is true
That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by "the
guy", you change it so often it's difficult to keep track.
> (assuming comp).
I do not assume "comp".
Lie.
> But they all feel to be different from the others
Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion 1ps and
not just one.
Sure, in the 3-1 view. But all those T billions 1p views, can
experience only one, like all copies confirmed all the time, in all
situation. You just fake to never listen to them.
> So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which
is a particular case of 3p/1p confusion.
Don't be ridiculous, nobody on planet Earth is confused by the
difference between the first person and the third person, but
everybody on planet Earth is confused by the difference between
the 3 view and the 3-1 view, and nobody is more confused than
Bruno Marchal.
Thus: see above.
> "the" is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense
with the definition of the views based on the diaries
Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the
duplication unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously
identified and you can't do that;
False. (Easy exercise, done many times).
and even if you could it would only tell you if a prediction turned
out to be right or not,
That is all what we need.
it would tell you nothing about the nature of consciousness.
Absolutely. Nobody ever said the contrary. On the contrary
computationalism is based on the consciousness is invariant for some
functional substitution.
This shows your remark to be straw man. To get the consequence on
consciousness, you need to read the work well beyond the UD Argument.
At least half of its translation into arithmetic.
UDA just shows that the Aristotelian theological notion of Primry
Matter is incompatible epistemologically with the digital version of
Descartes' Mechanism.
>> Of course I agree that the subjective experience
bifurcates when looking along the timeline in one direction, and
it unites when looking along the opposite direction. And that is
why personal identity can only be defined by looking toward the past
and not the future.
> Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of
coffee, if it is not because he associates a personal satisfaction
to its future self drinking the coffee.
There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make
coffee, but people who enjoy being alive and are good at
hypothesizing what the future will be
You make my point, and explicitly contradict yours.
like are more likely to pass more of their genes into the next
generation than people who don't enjoy life and aren't good at
making plans for the future. So you prepared that coffee because you
have some of those genes.
Confusion of levels. Search on "Searle" in the archive for more.
>> Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy
who intercepts a photon from Moscow will turn into the guy who
experiences Moscow and the guy who intercepts a photon from
Washington will turn into the guy who experiences
Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted.
> The guy in M sees M, sure, and the guy in W sees W. Nobody
doubt this: it is tautological.
I agree it most certainly is, but tautologies are always
true, so what's the problem? What remains un-predicted?
The personal experience that the candidate in Helsinki can expect to
live.
> But the prediction is asked in Helsinki.
Yes, and more important the answer was given in Helsinki too,
By reasoning, and using comp, but the confirmation must be tested on
the copies.
if the question was asked in Moscow the answer would be different.
The Moscow Man did not see Washington, but the Helsinki Man did, The
Washington Man did not see Moscow, but the Helsinki Man did.
The question is never asked in Moscow, nor in Washington. This is just
distraction.
> And ask if you will be that M guy or that W guy.
You you and you! Even at this late stage Bruno Marchal just can't
stop using that god damn ambiguous personal pronoun!
Because it was just made clear that the question was asked in
Helsinki, and you have recently, and more than once, accepted that the
pronoun was not ambiguous in Helsinki (i.e. before the duplication).
You want so much mock the use of pronouns that you mock them even in
the place you have agreed that it is not ambiguous.
But I remind you that the ambiguity of pronouns is in your head only,
as most of us have shown to you more than once.
> So in the 3-1 view, we don't get any information, but in the
1-views, both get one bit of information.
Before the duplication John Clark knew that the guy who intercepts
photons from Moscow will become the Moscow Man. After the
duplication John Clark intercepts photons from Moscow and knows he
became the Moscow Man. What new has been learned, what bit of new
information has been generated?
I was in Helsinki, and did not know if I would have become the W or
the M guy, given that I become both of them in the 3-1 description of
the protocol. Yet, after pushing the button, I get the personal,
private, and non justifiable feeling that I am the one in W, and not
the one, in M.
> you are saying that you just dies when pushing the button,
John Clark refuses to say anything more about "you" until
Bruno Marchal reveals what "you" means today.
I did, in most of the posts, but you systematically come back on
things that you said badly defined, but which you recast all the time
without the precision given.
It is already done in sane04. or in the 1988 Toulouse paper. The
definitions are the same since 1973 (public) or the sixties, in my
private notes.
Looks you are in the mode "trol" again.
It might be helpful to do that in the first line of every new
post.
just tell me now if you have grasped the difference between the 3p and
the 3-1p *and* the difference between the 3-1p and the 1p.
> So the W-guy looks at his path and remember being the H-guy.
Yes.
The M-guy looks at his path and remember being the H-guy.
Yes.
> The prediction that you made (W and M) is confirmed for the
3-1 view,
Nobody knows if it's confirmed or not because nobody knows what
the 3-1 view is.
I have just explained it in the post of yesterday.
You told me also that you have read Smullyan's forever undecided; so
just defined the 3p view by Smullyan's "B", and the 1-view by
Smullyan's "C" . Then the 3-1 view is formalized by BC.
Smullyan defines Cp by Bp & p, and read "Cp" as "correctly believes p"
or "know p", which is, basically, the classical common and natural
idea of Theaetetus to define knowledge.
See Smullyan's book page 74.
With classical computationalism, we interview machine computationalist
machine" (believing that the excluded middle principle can be applied
on the elementary computable element needed at the substitution level).
And the truly genuine miracle appears just there: the machine can
describes its 3-self, but not provably so, but the machine cannot
describe its 1-p self: the logic of Cp is given by S4Grz, and refers
to an undescribable entity which, from its point of view is not
describable, and confuse truth and proof all the time, it obeys
intutionistic logic, and when limited on the sigma_1 arithmetical or
combinatorial era, it provides a quantum intuitionistic logic. In the
Plotinus-Arithmetic lexicon: (and with or without the Dt nuance (D =
~B~, t = any tautology, like "0=s(0) -> 0=s(0)").
I have always been aware that some scientist can have problem with
thought experiences. I get the whole things by amoebas' observation,
but I decided to do math, instead of biology or philosophy, once I
realized that Gödel's use of Cantor's diagonal solve the problem of
defining mathematically the "3-self", and making so math the normal
filed for formulating the computationalist mind-body problem, or body
problem. It took me much more years of work to get the "1-self",
despite it has been mathematically discovered already by Boolos and
Goldblatt.
> but is refuted for both the W-guy and the H-guy.
The W-guy and the M-guy can't refute anything because the
prediction wasn't made about them,
The question was about them, as we have agreed that they are both the
H-guy.
(This strategy of yours is "changing the question asked without
saying").
it was made about the H guy.
Excellent. The H guy about the H guy experience that the H-guy can
expect to live among the two H guy experienceS that will be lived.
> the refutation of your point that there is no first person,
subjective, indeterminacy.
Of course there is first person subjective indeterminacy!
... in this special protocol of self-duplication, and where the
indeterminacy is brought by 3p sharable hypotheses of determinacy.
My point was that there was no new type of first person subjective
indeterminacy independent of the Quantum Mechanics type
The computationalist indeterminacy does not assume Quantum Mechanics.
It is subject of controverse in QM (cf "God does not play with dice",
or "Does it?").
With Everett, the QM indeterminacy is arguably reduced to the comp
indeterminacy, but that is not obvious at all, as Everett relies it to
Gleason theorem, and the ability to deduce the Born rules from the
internal first person plural histories brought by the Universal
quantum wave. As Bruce argues, we can't say that this has been
completely solved (despite I do think that Gleason theorem does solve
the problem, but it is a complex subject).
So the relation between the quantum indeterminacy and the FPI is just
this: an open problem. Then computationalism shed light on this, as
the point made is that Everett can only work if that person plural
type of histories ("MWI") emerges from the Sigma_1 (arithmetical)
reality, which emulates *all* computations (classical, quantum, and
all yet unknown).
and of the Godel/Turing type discovered 90 years ago.
The FPI has just nothing to do with the definition of that type of
indeterminacies.
On the contrary, we can use the logic of self-reference (G and G*) to
get logics of the indeterminacy, and related, from an analysis of
mechanism and computer science, that is, the Bp &p, and Bp & Dp, and
Bp &Dp & p logics (with p sigma_1).
And it works, we do get a modal quantization (with p -> []<>p where we
need it!).
If someone succeed in proving that we can't emulate a quantum NOR, in
any of those arithmetical "quantum logic", classical computationalism
is refuted (or we are in a "perverse emulation" à-la Boström).
But again, if you agree with the FPI, it is just logically irelevant
that it is a new discovery or an old one, or that is important or not
important, for that type of question, all you need to do is to tell us
if you are OK with this:
IF [P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the step 3 protocol] THEN [P(W) = P(M) =
1/2 in the step 4 protocol]
The difference between step 3 and step 4 is that in step we explicitly
introduce some long delay of reconstitution in Moscow.
The "1/2" is not really needed to get the ultimate consequences, but
it helps to fix the things. You can replace it by any number, even
higher than 1, as in "real life" the probabilities might appear to be
credibilities or plausibilities (it is just that "probability" is the
most familiar name of a technic to quantify indeterminacy of outcomes/
events).
So, what do you think? Do you expect, like some people that P(W) is
bigger than P(M) due to the delay of reconstitution in Moscow, or do
you think that the delay is irrelevant and that we should expect the
same as in the protocol 3, like above?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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