On 09 Aug 2015, at 01:00, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 8, 2015 Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
> If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas
who remember having been you (if amoebas had memories).
Yes, and it would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division
if *you* will swim to the left or to the right after the division,
almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was THE one true
original amoeba that had "THE 1p you".
But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such
"the". On the cntrary, we have insisted that to get the statistics of
the 1p we have to accept that the verification is done on all copies.
It is annoying how much you use the "straw man" trick, criticizing
stupid idea like if someone was defending them.
> you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one
universe.
Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that
the laws of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same
way as it treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different
language, MWI has nothing specific to say about consciousness.
False. The MWI invoke the computationalist theory of consciousness.
> In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the
definition of the observer as comprised in the digital state of some
machine,
But definitions are exactly the problem. In Bruno's thought
experiment what is the definition of "you"? One some days Bruno says
it's the man who remembers being a man in Helsinki and that's fine,
but on other days Bruno adds the mysterious proviso "in THE 1p" and
on still other days the definition of "you" must include "in the 3p.
So what the hell is the definition of "you"?
Because we take into account the difference of perspective of any
person.
We don't use "you", nor "JC".
We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-JC.
3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot. Or, if you argue that 1-you
can be in both place, it means you talk about the 3-1-you.
1-you can't be in both place, as 1-you refer to the content of the
subjective experience lived by those having the memory of Helsinki,
and fater the duplication and differentiation, such 1-you have 1-
incompatible experience: as no person can open a door and feel
personally to see the two cities, as you have agreed often.
>> Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately
always neglects to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say THE
1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no
good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the
one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary.
> Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after
the duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim.
If John doesn't understand Bruno but Pierz says he does then
Pierz should be able to tell John exactly what "THE 1p you" means in
a world with people duplicating machines. I'm all ears!
If you did the thought experiment, you would get the answer to this.
Assuming comp you have the following belief: I will push the button,
open a door and see once city among W and M, and never both. So THE
future experience means THE experience of the one city that I will
feel personally to live (and given comp and the protocole, it will be
either W or M (and never both). Then by reading BOTH diaries, we get
that this is confirmed by both copies (and W & M is refuted by both
copies).
>> But it is not irrelevant to the question of
pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with
pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics
ensure that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not
the case with people duplicating machines. Stage magicians use
pretty assistants to distract the audience from
their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. Bruno says
that computationalism can't predict what YOU will see next so
there must be some aspect of consciousness that the computational
theory of mind can not explain,
> Say what? Say WHAT? Bruno's argument is based purely on a
computational theory of mind!
Bruno argument is that if the computational theory of mind is
correct (and only a fool would say it is not) then it should be
able to determine the future state of a conscious observer
, but Bruno says it cannot and indeterminacy remains so
computationalism can't be the entire story. However Bruno is
incorrect, computationalism precisely determines that the
Moscow man will be the man who sees photons from Moscow because a
photons from Moscow is the very thing that turns the Helsinki man
into the Moscow man, and a corresponding thing happens to the
Washington man.
Then again, your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM.
As, exactly what you say here applies in the term of the superposition.
But again, this only shows that the 3-view (and the 3-1-view, etc.)
evolves deterministically. But in both classical and quantum type of
self-duplication, that very 3p determinism entails the 1p ignorance of
the specific 1p result the experiencer can have.
Computationalism tells you that you will be duplicated and one
you will see Moscow and one you will see Washington. Will the you
who sees Moscow and not Washington be surprised?
No, as it satisfied the correct prediction made by everybody "W v M".
Will the you who sees Washington and not Moscow be
surprised? No, not if you is rational, it's exactly what you
, a believer in computationalism, predicted
would happen.
But none were "W and M" (as W and M refer to the 1p, not any 3p
description). You make my point.
John Clark of course know what the response to this will be, "You
forgot THE peepee!
You forget the "THEs"? the experience are "unique city among W and M"
for BOTH.
What about THE peepee?
You know in advance that the 1p cannot survive in both city in ANY of
the logically 1p-available 1p view.
BOTH copies confirms this, and in case they did not understand the
question, now they will. You just don't listen to them.
In the future what will *YOU*see in the peepee?". There is no answer
to that because unfortunately Bruno never specifies in whose peepee,
Bruno doesn't have a consistent definition of "you".
I don't use "you". I use 1p-<whatever-name> or 3p-<whatever-name>, or
3-1p-<whatever-name>.
> Bruno's argument needs no pronouns to go through.
Then why does Bruno throw around pronouns like a drunken sailor
throws around money in ever post Bruno writes? And why does Bruno
talk about THE X even when X is clearly plural?
The 3-1 view is plural, but the 1-view is and remains singular, as
every-one reading the definition, understand without any trouble.
Take the iterated duplication, when you are multiplied by 2^(16180 *
10000) * (60 * 90) * 24
I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90), into as
many copies can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 * 10000)
possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000 pixels, which can be
black or white each.
When we ask what is THE experience that you will live, we refer to any
of the incompatible experiences that the copies will live. Some will
see a movie by Hitschcock, other by Wim Wenders, but the vast majority
will see white noise. By definition of the notion of first person
experience (the content of the diary) P(movie by Wenders) is low,
P(white noise) is great.
As I said, the problem is not in the pronouns, but in reading the
question which is about the personal expectation of the well defined
experience that you will feel to live in the 1p sense (as you agree
that we survive such duplication experience, and the experience
obtained are necessarily incompatible).
P( Wenders or arbitrary noise) = 1
P(Wenders and Hitschock) = 0 (no copies at all will see the two
movies at once, although in this case some will see approximation of
that, ..., bit just because some precise movie will blur two movies).
P(Wenders or Hitschcock) is close to 0.
P(whote noise) is big.
To sum up: confusion 3p/1p or 3-1p/1-1p again.
Nobody can figure out what your theory predict when we ask what
anybody can expect to live in such circumstance. Your critics of the
argument is entirely based on the fact that you omit to listen to all
copies (or a good sample of them when there are too many) after the
duplication(s) is (are) done.
Bruno
John K Clark
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