So here's an excerpt from this paper: h
ttp://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609006v1.pdf, which was recently linked in 
response to a question I asked about MWI. This seems to echo *exactly* your 
concerns about identity/pronouns in the duplication experiment, and to 
resolve them, even though this is of course talking about MWI. You can just 
substitute "Washington" for |up⟩, and Helsinki man for neutron, duplicator 
for beam splitter etc. What this shows is that you are exactly in the 
position of the "neutron" that knows about MWI when evaluating Bruno's 
scenario. You are simply refusing to take the "sleeping pill".


It is more difficult to define a concept of probability for those 
experimenters and those neutrons who know MWI. They understand that the 
belief of the neutron (it might be more correct to say “the belief of both 
neutrons”), that there is just one world, is an illusion. There are two 
worlds in parallel: one with the neutron in the state |up⟩ and the other 
with the neutron in the state |down⟩. Thus, the phrase “the probability for 
the neutron to be found at D1” seems senseless. Indeed, it is not clear 
what “the neutron” in this phrase means, and it seems that whatever neutron 
we consider, we cannot obtain |α|2 for the probability. For the neutron 
passing through a beam splitter the probability to end up at D1 as opposed to 
D2 is meaningless because this neutron becomes two neutrons. The two new 
neutrons are identified with the old one: the neutron detected by D1 and 
the neutron detected by D2 both entered the beam splitter. The new neutrons 
have no identity problem; the neutron at D1 has the direct experience of 
being at D1 as opposed to D2, but it seems that the probability for that 
neutron to be at D1 is just 1. We cannot assign any other number to this 
probability, but the neutron can. Suppose that the neutron (not enjoying 
beam splitters) took a sleeping pill and slept until it reached a detector. 
Now, if it awakes inside the detector but has not yet opened its eyes, the 
neutron (an expert in quantum mechanics) can say: “I have a probability |α|2 
to find myself in D1”. This is an “ignorance-type” probability. We, like 
any external system, cannot be ignorant about the location of the neutron 
since we identify it using its location, while each sentient neutron does 
not need information to identify itself.4 The second new neutron, the one 
at D2, before opening his eyes has exactly the same belief: “I have a 
probability |α|2 to find myself in D1”. The neutron entering the 
beam-splitter converts into two neutrons which have the same belief about 
probability. This allows us to associate the probability for the neutron 
entering the beam-splitter to end up at D1 as the probability of its 
ancestors to end up there. 

On Wednesday, August 12, 2015 at 10:46:54 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>
> ​
> ​>> ​
> Oh no​, now we have the two 3-1 p view
> ​!​
>
>
> ​> ​
> We have this since the beginning.
>
>
> ​That explains your profound confusion. ​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy,
>
>
> ​Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before the 
> door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to experience 
> different things there is only one person so naturally there is only one 
> first person view;​
>  
> ​after the door is opened there are many persons and a corresponding 
> number of views. ​
>
> ​> ​
> but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree 
> they are incompatible.
>
>
> ​Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as "*the* 
> 1-view".​
>  
>
> ​ 
> ​>> ​
> your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by 
> ​> ​
> who?
>
>
> ​> ​
> By anyone, 
>
>
> ​By any third party, in other words the third party view. ​
>  I don't understand the difference between ​ "3p view" and "3-1" view. 
>
> ​>> ​
> If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, 
>
>
> ​> ​
> No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an 
> 1-view.
>
>
> ​If we had such access there would be no difference between objective 
> and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since we can't a 
> different name is required and it's called, in your homemade terminology, 
> "3p view". And I still don't understand the difference between ​"3p view" 
> and  "3-1" view. Do you?
>  
>
> ​> ​
> So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary,
>
>
> ​In other words the 3 view.​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view,
>
>
> ​In other words the 3 view.​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> but not necessarily our own. 
>
>
> ​In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. ​And I still don't 
> understand the difference between ​the 3 view and the 3-1 view.
>
> ​> ​
> 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.
>
>
> ​Aka the 3 view.​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true 
>
>
> ​That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by "the guy", you 
> change it so often it's difficult to keep track. 
>  
>
> ​> ​
> (assuming comp).
>
>
> ​I do not assume "comp".​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> But they all feel to be different from the others
>
>
> ​Yes, and that's exactly why there are ​
> ​7.1 billion 1ps and not just one.​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a 
> particular case of 3p/1p confusion.
>
>
> ​Don't be ridiculous, nobody on planet Earth is confused by the difference 
> between the first person and the third person, but everybody on planet 
> Earth is confused by the difference 
>  between ​the 3 view and the 3-1 view
> ​, and nobody is more confused than Bruno Marchal.​
>
> ​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> "the" is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense with the 
> definition of the views based on the diaries
>
>
> ​Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the duplication 
> unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously identified and you 
> can't do that; and even if you could it would only tell you if a prediction 
> turned out to be right or not, it would tell you nothing about the nature 
> of consciousness.    ​
>  
>
> ​>> ​​Of course I agree that the subjective experience​
>
>  bifurcates
> ​ when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites when 
> ​looking along the opposite direction. And that is why personal identity 
> can only be defined by looking toward the past and not the future.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of coffee, if it is 
> not because he associates a personal satisfaction to its future self 
> drinking the coffee.
>
>
> ​There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make coffee, 
> but 
> people who enjoy being alive 
> ​and 
> are good 
> ​at 
> hypothesizing what the future will be like
> ​ are more likely to
>  pass more of their genes into the next generation than people who 
> ​don't enjoy life and aren't good ​at making plans for the future. So you 
> prepared that coffee because you have some of those genes.
>
> ​
> ​>> ​
> Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy who intercepts a 
> photon from Moscow will ​turn into the guy who experiences Moscow and the guy 
> who intercepts a photon from 
> ​Washington​
>  will ​turn into the guy who experiences 
> ​Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted. ​
>
>
> ​> ​
> The guy in M sees M, sure, and the guy in W sees W. Nobody doubt this: it 
> is tautological. 
>
>
> ​I agree it most certainly is, but 
> tautologies
> ​ 
> are always true, ​
> ​so what's the problem?​ What remains un-predicted? 
>  ​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> But the prediction is asked in Helsinki.
>
>
> ​Yes, and more important the answer was given in Helsinki too, if the 
> question was asked in Moscow the answer would be different. The Moscow Man 
> did not see Washington, but the Helsinki Man did, The Washington Man did 
> not see Moscow, but the Helsinki Man did. ​
>  
>
>  
> ​> ​
> And ask if you will be that M guy or that W guy.
>
> ​You you and you! Even at this late stage Bruno Marchal just can't stop 
> using that god damn ambiguous personal pronoun!​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> So in the 3-1 view, we don't get any information, but in the 1-views, both 
> get one bit of information.
>
>
> ​Before the duplication John Clark knew that the guy who intercepts 
> photons from Moscow will become the Moscow Man. After the duplication John 
> Clark ​intercepts photons from Moscow and knows he became the Moscow Man. 
> What new has been learned, what bit of new information has been generated?
>  
>
> ​> ​
> you are saying that you just dies when pushing the button, 
>
>
> ​John Clark refuses to say anything 
> ​more ​
> about "you" until Bruno Marchal reveals what "you" means today. It might 
> be helpful to do that in the first line of every
> ​ new​
> post.   ​
>
> ​> ​
> So the W-guy looks at his path and remember being the H-guy.
>
>
> ​*Yes.​*
>  
>
>  The M-guy looks at his path and remember being the H-guy.
>
> ​*Yes.*​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> The prediction that you made (W and M) is confirmed for the 3-1 view, 
>
>
> ​Nob
> ...

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