On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote: > > > My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it > leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. > > Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion >
It's either an illusion or it is not and peepee is not involved. And it is an experimental fact that Bell's inequality is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will flap his wings). So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that things are realistic , local , and deterministic can not be correct , at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be. >> >> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, >> but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of >> both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think >> he has. >> > > > > To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. > MWI says everything that can happen to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are lots and lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is not singular, it is plural. Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary. > > > If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of > FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. > Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in finding out that sometimes "you" doesn't know what "you" will see next, but I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years. > > > Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy > occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a > physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather > than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the > validity of the logic > But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with people duplicating machines. Stage magicians use pretty assistants to distract the audience from their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. Bruno says that c omputationalism can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of consciousness that the computational theory of mind can not explain, but in reality what c omputationalism (or anything else) can't explain is what the hell Bruno means by "you". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
