On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >> >> would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if **you** will >> swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly as >> asking which of the 2 amoebas was *THE* one true original amoeba that >> had "*THE* 1p you". > > > > > But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such "the". > Someone on this list has. In nearly every post Bruno Marchal says that from *THE *1p *you* will see this but from *THE* 1p*you* will not see that; but if there is more than one then the statement becomes meaningless. > > We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-JC. > So in Bruno's unusual peepee notation 1-JC is John Clark's subjective experience and 3-JC is John Clark's objective actions, but what the hell is 3-1-JC and how does it differ from regular old 3-JC? > > > 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot. > Maybe maybe not, it all depends on what "you" means, but neither JC nor 3-JC nor 3-1JC nor 1-3-1JC knows what Bruno Marchal means by that pronoun, and by now it's pretty obvious that Bruno Marchal doesn't either. > > > > if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you talk about the > 3-1-you. > Is Bruno Marchal "you", or *the* 1-you, or *the *3-you, or *the* 3-1-you? >>> >> you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe. > > > >> > Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that the laws > of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same way as it > treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different language, MWI has > nothing specific to say about consciousness. > > > > False. The MWI invoke the computationalist theory of consciousness. The MWI is perfectly compatible with the computationalist theory of consciousness so you can stick it on if you want but it is not necessary , the MWI works just fine without it or without any theory of consciousness at all . > > Assuming comp > John Clark does not assume "comp". > > > you have the following belief: I will > [...] > The word "will" implies the future and if you thinks that computationalism is true, that is to say that you is rational, then you thinks that the subjective future will bifurcate. If you is not rational then you could believe anything, but you's beliefs in what will happen, true or false, will in no way effect what will in fact happen. > > > push the button, open a door and see > [...] > What I believes I will see depends entirely on what I means by I when dealing with the future in a world with "I" duplicating machines. The English language in general and in person pronouns in particular was never designed with this sort of thing in mind . > > > your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM. > I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was deterministic. > > Nobody can figure out what your theory predict > C omputationalism predicts that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Moscow will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Moscow (aka The Moscow Man). And c omputationalism says that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Washington will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Washington (aka The Washington Man). What remains indeterminate? What has the computational theory of mind failed to predict? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
