On 09 Aug 2015, at 22:53, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if
*you* will swim to the left or to the right after the division,
almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was THE one true
original amoeba that had "THE 1p you".
> But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only
one such "the".
Someone on this list has. In nearly every post Bruno
Marchal says that from THE 1p *you* will see this but from THE
1p*you* will not see that; but if there is more than one then the
statement becomes meaningless.
Not at all. Because the question is on the 1-p you, and you know (in
advance, in Helsinki) that there will be only one 1-view from any of
the two 3-1 p view available. You look like trying to be wrong on
purpose.
> We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-
JC.
So in Bruno's unusual peepee notation 1-JC is John Clark's
subjective experience and 3-JC is John Clark's objective actions,
but what the hell is 3-1-JC and how does it differ from regular
old 3-JC?
3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities.
3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience, of frst person view ascribed
to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view lived by the
person attached to such bodies. 1p are always single solitary and
definite.
> 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot.
Maybe maybe not, it all depends on what "you" means, but
neither JC nor 3-JC nor 3-1JC nor 1-3-1JC knows what Bruno
Marchal means by that pronoun, and by now it's pretty obvious that
Bruno Marchal doesn't either.
In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition of the
1p-you, more precise than "the one who remember ..", but for the UDA
reversal, the first definition is quite enough.
> if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you
talk about the 3-1-you.
Is Bruno Marchal "you", or the 1-you, or the 3-you, or the 3-1-
you?
For *any* creature, you can consider its "you" in the 1p sense, or the
3-1p sense, or the 3p sense, etc.
If Bruno Marchal has an headache, this is pure 1p, if he send a mail,
that is 3p (at first). Much later, if we ever arrive there, we will
see that the body is not really a 3p thing, but an 1p-plural object,
but this is not relevant here(it is relevant for "after-life" type of
question, though, but useless and confusing to accept at this stage,
despite QM suggests it (but we can't use QM).
> you have the following belief: I will [...]
The word "will" implies the future and if you thinks that
computationalism is true, that is to say that you is rational, then
you thinks that the subjective future will bifurcate.
That is the point.
And if you agree it bifurcates, a simple reasoning (that we have done
many times) shows that you are unable to predict the 1p outcomes of
that bifurcation.
If you is not rational then you could believe anything, but you's
beliefs in what will happen, true or false, will in no way effect
what will in fact happen.
> push the button, open a door and see [...]
What I believes I will see depends entirely on what I means
by I when dealing with the future in a world with "I" duplicating
machines.
But as we assume computationalism, there is no ambiguity at all, and
the result depends only on the maning of "I" or "you" on which we have
already agreed, but of course we need to take into account the 1p/3p
nuances to get the answer right, given that the question bears on that
1p perspective.
The English language in general and in person pronouns in particular
was never designed with this sort of thing in mind .
Sure, but computationalism makes what happens crystal clear, unless
you forget that the question bears on the subjective experiences.
> your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM.
I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was
deterministic.
In the 3p view, but for the 1p (and here 1p-plural) we have to derive
and use the Born probability rule, like in the WM-duplication we have
to use the P(W v M) = 1 and P(W & M) = 0 rule.
> Nobody can figure out what your theory predict
Computationalism predicts that after the bodies have
been duplicated photons from Moscow will turn the Helsinki Man into
the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Moscow (aka The
Moscow Man). And computationalism says that after the bodies
have been duplicated photons from Washington will turn the Helsinki
Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from
Washington (aka The Washington Man). What remains indeterminate?
The experience that the guy will who undergone such duplication can
expect to live. Obviously, given the protocol he must expect to wake
up in W or in M, and not in both.
What has the computational theory of mind failed to predict?
What your computational theory of mind fails to predict is the outcome
of the result of pushing on the button from the first person
perspective which are the only available to the guy pushing the button
in Helsinki.
But the computational theory of mind has no problem in making the
prediction: it P(W v M) = 1, and as W and M are incompatible, and as
the person body are numerically identical, it is reasonable to think
that P(M) = P(W), and thus P(M) = 1/2. The verification by the copies
shows this to be exact (unlike any other know ways).
Bruno
John K Clark
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