On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from
the original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as
the original?
They both remember being that person.
Sure, and if that is your sole criterion of identity, they are still
the one person.
But they are not "one person". Although they share the same memories
of before the duplication that have different memories afterward.
According to that argument, you are not the "one person" from moment to
moment because you have different memories as new things happen to you.
Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to
be a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?
Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes. It doesn't
seem any more problematic than being continuous with my 50yr old self.
Or your 70 yo. self reduced to a vegetative state?
I said "insofar as my state had a psychology". In a vegatative state
I'd say there is probably no survival of any psychology. There's
nothing to be continuous with. It's like following a road that turns
into a trail that turns into a path and finally becomes unrecognizable
from the rest of the terrain. Whether we call it "the same" along
it's length is just a semantic choice, analogous to having a legal
ruling on personhood.
But still, the common intuition is that the body on the bed after severe
head injury is still the same person as before -- just without memories,
though who can say if still conscious or not?
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno,
based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is
some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories
and hence of his past experience. If it's independent of
experience then it can't be bifurcated by experience.
That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to
be important to personhood.
But maybe not explicit memories. If I suffered amnesia and didn't
remember any of my past life, I would still retain many
characteristics that would make me recognizable to my friends.
These may derive from experience, but they would be encoded in the
physics of my brain and wouldn't imply dualism.
No, but it does imply that memories are only one of the many
dimensions that are important in defining the self, or in determining
personal identity. Is physical continuity one of the other important
dimensions?
Physical continuity is a good indicator in the absence of duplicating
machines, but I don't think it's definitive. Consider the example of
multiple-personality-disorder, in which seemingly different persons
occupy the same body at different times.
Hence the no-branching condition in theories of personal identity.
Branching - recombining, both play havoc with one-one notions of
identity. So how is identity to be defined?
Bruce
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