On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as
long at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not
almost everything, not everything except for the 1-view,
EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that then
computationalism
is wrong, but you can't just assume
computationalism
can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then
claim you've proven something about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the
1-view pov
") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno
correctly, his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the
sum over all computations passing through your conscious state, or
something similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in
complete detail, then you have nothing more than yet another
computation that passes through your conscious state, so there can
be only one consciousness!
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics'
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility
cannot be ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result
of such a duplication experiment. I think this is a question that
can only be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating
machine and see what happens!
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation
twice necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness,
so, despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a
person does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view
from the 3p perspective),
It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another
person, it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also
physics that is below or indirectly related conscious experience.
This is what makes you a different person from who you were in the
past.
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from
the original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as
the original?
They both remember being that person.
Sure, and if that is your sole criterion of identity, they are still
the one person.
But they are not "one person". Although they share the same memories of
before the duplication that have different memories afterward.
Personal identity through time seems to be related to psychological
continuity; the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically
continuous with the original, so both are the original person.
I'm not sure what you mean by "psychological continuity". I've
argued that thoughts have a duration in time and they overlap, so
they produce a continuum of experiences. But this doesn't bridge
concussions and anesthesia, and probably not duplication machines.
Or do you mean something like "character" or "values" or "tendencies"
that would presumably carry over to duplicates as do memories but are
less explicit.
Psychological continuity means that one can find a series of
overlapping periods between which the changes in memories, character,
values, desires, and so on, change in a regular and explicable way.
During periods of unconsciousness, these psychological characteristics
may not change at all, or if they do change, they change in explicable
ways.
The problem with psychological continuity as a criterion of identity
is that it is not a one-one relation (it is not transitive). Parfit
argues that psychological continuity a ground for speaking of identity
when it is one-one. If it took a one-many or branching form, then
Parfit argues that we have to abandon the language of identity. "If
psychology took a branching form, no coherent set of judgements of
identity could correspond to, and thus be used to imply, the branching
form of this relation."
Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to
be a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?
Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes. It doesn't
seem any more problematic than being continuous with my 50yr old self.
Or your 70 yo. self reduced to a vegetative state?
I said "insofar as my state had a psychology". In a vegatative state
I'd say there is probably no survival of any psychology. There's nothing
to be continuous with. It's like following a road that turns into a
trail that turns into a path and finally becomes unrecognizable from the
rest of the terrain. Whether we call it "the same" along it's length is
just a semantic choice, analogous to having a legal ruling on personhood.
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno,
based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is
some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories
and hence of his past experience. If it's independent of
experience then it can't be bifurcated by experience.
That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to
be important to personhood.
But maybe not explicit memories. If I suffered amnesia and didn't
remember any of my past life, I would still retain many
characteristics that would make me recognizable to my friends. These
may derive from experience, but they would be encoded in the physics
of my brain and wouldn't imply dualism.
No, but it does imply that memories are only one of the many
dimensions that are important in defining the self, or in determining
personal identity. Is physical continuity one of the other important
dimensions?
Physical continuity is a good indicator in the absence of duplicating
machines, but I don't think it's definitive. Consider the example of
multiple-personality-disorder, in which seemingly different persons
occupy the same body at different times.
Brent
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