On 01 Aug 2016, at 11:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 1/08/2016 5:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 August 2016 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
I do not think that any "spooky action at a distance" is necessary.
To think that it is necessary for one consciousness to inhabit two
distinct bodies is to make a physicalist assumption -- namely, to
identify consciousness with the activity and content of a single
brain. If we drop that assumption, consciousness, per se, is not
tied to a single location -- it could be in several places (or
times) at once without the need for any physical connection (that
is what non-locality is all about).
A duplicate of my brain with the same inputs would, under the
physicalist assumption, have the same experiences. That would mean
that I could not say which brain my consciousness was linked to; if
one brain were destroyed, my experience would continue
uninterrupted. On the contrary, it would require a non-physicalist
theory of some sort if the consciouness of two identical brains
could be distinguished.
There is no real dispute that two identical brains with identical
inputs would have identical experiences.
OK.
However, I think we were talking about the case of different input
-- seeing different cities for instance.
Yes, and this extending a singular computation. As you say, it is the
same computation getting suddenly, but predictibly, different inputs
at different locations.
Duplicates would have different experiences in that case --
Yes, staring from that moment. But computationalism ensures that both
can confirm that they did survive, with the same memory on what
happened before that duplication. Both confirms, as computationalism
predicts, that they feel one and entire, at a unique place, with (at
least) one bit of information more. Now, they both know which one of
the two cities get instantiated from their subjective, first personal
view.
the question is would there be more than one consciousness?
Well, that is an interesting question, but it is not relevant for the
understanding that computationalism leads to the problem of extracting
the physical laws from a measure on relative computations problem in
arithmetic.
Bruno
Bruce
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