On 30 Jul 2016, at 15:03, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/30/2016 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno,
based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is
some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories
and hence of his past experience. If it's independent of
experience then it can't be bifurcated by experience.
Sure, but salvia has nothing to do with this. It has only to do
with the global, absolute notion of person, which is not used in
UDA, nor AUDA, discovered 40 years before! The soul, here, is just
the owner of the 1p experience. To believe in it is a direct
consequence of computationalism.
What is this "global absolute notion of a person"?
If computationalism is true it is the Glass of Milk Itself, or perhaps
Its Mother. I dunno. It is personal, and saying this would belong to
qG* minus qG. It is the solution of the koan "who am I", and some
drugs can shake the brain helping in cleaning the mind from lazy
neuronal habits (first person: prejudices) around that notion. But it
is not needed in the reasoning.
Salvia can perhaps help some people on such questions by making them
live the dream argument in a particularly acute and convincing way,
but person not familiar with that kind of doubting can be very
confused and panicking.
Is person with amnesia the same as with memories?
It is the same in the sense that you are the same guy who decided to
take holiday and who comes back from those holidays. That is the sense
important in practical application: to survive the experience, and get
the most plausible prediction possible, when into action.
When a physicist predicts that we will see (first person experience)
an eclipse tomorrow, we need to assume we stay enough the same to say
that the prediction was first person fulfilled. And the physicist must
assume the absence of some Boltzman brain in the physical universe,
and how the physical universe select the computation from the
(sigma_1) arithmetical reality, where all computations belongs
(digitalness break the brain-mind identity link: we can attribute a
mind to a number-3-person, but a number-1-person can only attritbute
an infinity of number-3-person to itself. (But that needs step 7 and a
bit more).
So yes, a person can be the same without its memories, and losing
memories is a bit like going back to (subjective) time, especially if
you lose them in the FILO memory mode (First In Last Out).
In the duplication scenario, we need no more notion of personal
identity that the one needed to say "yes" to the job on mars, with
obligation of using the classical teleportation Earth-Mars machine.
Then you know that you will survive a duplication too, and that you
are unable to predict what you will specifically write in your
boarding diary. You need to eliminate the first discourses, burn the
personal diaries, to eliminate this very simple and particular first
person indeterminacy. The numerical identity of the copies guaranties
that the statistics on the number of times you see this or that cities
are given by the Pascal triangle or its Gaussian limit, almost by
definition of the first person history (the sequence of W and M
figuring in each diary).
When John Clark understand this, the attack are on the originality or
the deepness of this result, but of course, that is out of topic and
is an inconsistent excuse for not moving toward step 4 and sequel.
Step 3 (the FPI in the symmetrical duplication) is a direct and simple
consequence of computationalism and the 3p definition used here of
first person (the personal memory track).
Bruno
Brent
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