On Monday, 1 August 2016, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 1/08/2016 5:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 1 August 2016 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > > >> I do not think that any "spooky action at a distance" is necessary. To >> think that it is necessary for one consciousness to inhabit two distinct >> bodies is to make a physicalist assumption -- namely, to identify >> consciousness with the activity and content of a single brain. If we drop >> that assumption, consciousness, *per se*, is not tied to a single >> location -- it could be in several places (or times) at once without the >> need for any physical connection (that is what non-locality is all about). >> > > A duplicate of my brain with the same inputs would, under the physicalist > assumption, have the same experiences. That would mean that I could not say > which brain my consciousness was linked to; if one brain were destroyed, my > experience would continue uninterrupted. On the contrary, it would require > a non-physicalist theory of some sort if the consciouness of two identical > brains could be distinguished. > > > There is no real dispute that two identical brains with identical inputs > would have identical experiences. However, I think we were talking about > the case of different input -- seeing different cities for instance. > Duplicates would have different experiences in that case -- the question is > would there be more than one consciousness? > Yes. I don't see how the consciousnesses could possibly be linked once they have differentiated. They're not really linked if they don't differentiate either, it's just that in that case they are fungible. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
