On 1/08/2016 5:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 August 2016 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I do not think that any "spooky action at a distance" is
necessary. To think that it is necessary for one consciousness to
inhabit two distinct bodies is to make a physicalist assumption --
namely, to identify consciousness with the activity and content of
a single brain. If we drop that assumption, consciousness, /per
se/, is not tied to a single location -- it could be in several
places (or times) at once without the need for any physical
connection (that is what non-locality is all about).
A duplicate of my brain with the same inputs would, under the
physicalist assumption, have the same experiences. That would mean
that I could not say which brain my consciousness was linked to; if
one brain were destroyed, my experience would continue uninterrupted.
On the contrary, it would require a non-physicalist theory of some
sort if the consciouness of two identical brains could be distinguished.
There is no real dispute that two identical brains with identical inputs
would have identical experiences. However, I think we were talking about
the case of different input -- seeing different cities for instance.
Duplicates would have different experiences in that case -- the question
is would there be more than one consciousness?
Bruce
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