On 1 August 2016 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> I do not think that any "spooky action at a distance" is necessary. To > think that it is necessary for one consciousness to inhabit two distinct > bodies is to make a physicalist assumption -- namely, to identify > consciousness with the activity and content of a single brain. If we drop > that assumption, consciousness, *per se*, is not tied to a single > location -- it could be in several places (or times) at once without the > need for any physical connection (that is what non-locality is all about). > A duplicate of my brain with the same inputs would, under the physicalist assumption, have the same experiences. That would mean that I could not say which brain my consciousness was linked to; if one brain were destroyed, my experience would continue uninterrupted. On the contrary, it would require a non-physicalist theory of some sort if the consciouness of two identical brains could be distinguished. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
