On 27/04/2017 2:47 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Apr 2017, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I was interested to see if you had anything useful to offer. Also, it
seems to be a good idea to have a few contrary voices on this list --
otherwise you would be speaking in an echo chamber where everybody
thought alike. Or else just preaching to the choir. That is never a
healthy situation.
We have to disagree if we want an interesting conversation.
But it is even more interesting when we talk on the points, and see if
and where we disagree, so that we can progress.
Certainly. So that might explain to you why I remain on this list.
Pirmary matter is an hypothesis that we do in metaphysics/theology,
not in physics.
So if computationalism is just metaphysics/theology, what has it got
to do with the real world?
When you say "yes" to the doctor, you are practising that theology,
and are using some theotechnology, a limit of biotechnology.
If I say "yes" to the doctor, I am simply accepting that if the brain is
replaced by a completely equivalent device, then I will survive. This is
a matter of understanding the physics -- not a theological matter.
John Clark, for example, told us that the did already say yes to a
doctor for some future through cryogenisation.
Then, the whole point is that the computationalist theology is
falsifiable in the real world. So let us see and explore.
OK then. So if the point is to compare computationalism with the real
world, you need to derive results that refer to the real (experienced
physical) world. So you can't really criticize me for requiring some
substantial results, and withholding judgment until you can produce such
results.
You say that 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact in reality. But that is a fact only
in arithmetical reality.
"only" if you assume something else. Better to be neutral at the start.
What else? Neutral about what? You assume the arithmetic reality, is
that not something?
It relates to the physical world only if one defines a mapping
between the symbols and experienced objects.
Experienced objects are appearance made by a brain, we don't know if
there is a physical *world*.
We know that we experience something that we call the physical world.
Numbers are perceived by the brain also, so if you are to progress, you
have to find a mapping between them.
And the point is that if we assume digital mechanism, then below our
level of substitution, there is an infinity of universal numbers which
competes for your continuations. mechanism entails an
2^aleph_0-plication experience. We can't use the traditional identity
links.
And that model has not been shown to produce anything like our
experienced world. That is the shortcoming of your position.
So you have to map the computations of the dovetailer to the world,
Which world?
Don't be obtuse. The experienced physical world, that is what I have
been talking about. If you want to deny experience, go ahead. But we
have to assume that our experience of the world, all other things being
equal, is veridicial.
and that mapping is not part of the definition of the dovetailer.
Indeed. The dovetailer is executed in the model of arithmetic.
You seem to want to construct the necessary mapping by reference to
the perceived world, but that makes the perceived world logically
prior to your account of it -- you can't account for it unless you
already assume it.
I don't come up with any world.
So your theory has failed to account for experience.
Strictly speaking, we have already an explanation of the quantum
appearance,
Not really. Some logic that has some features in common with some of the
proposed quantum logics is a pretty thin achievement. After all, it is a
widespread view that there is not really any specific quantum logic --
there is just propositional logic applied in different situations. You
always interpret these more abstract logics in terms of ordinary
propositional logic, so they are derivative and can be disregarded.
but it is an open problem if there is anything even looking like a
complete physical worlds. It is more like a web of dreams with a
coherent core leading to deep sharable computations, or relatively
stable multi-user video games. You can't invalidate an argument by
invoking your own theory (which seems to assume that there is some world).
There is conscious experience, and that is all that is necessary. If
you deny that there is experience, it seems strange that you should be
so concerned about consciousness! You can invalidate an argument by
showing that its conclusions are not in accord with the facts. Your
argument has to be sound -- mere formal validity is not enough. If the
conclusions do not accord with observation, then you have gone wrong
somewhere. It is not necessary for the critic to find the mistake. That
is your problem.
Bruce
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