On 27 Apr 2017, at 03:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 27/04/2017 2:47 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Apr 2017, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I was interested to see if you had anything useful to offer. Also,
it seems to be a good idea to have a few contrary voices on this
list -- otherwise you would be speaking in an echo chamber where
everybody thought alike. Or else just preaching to the choir. That
is never a healthy situation.
We have to disagree if we want an interesting conversation.
But it is even more interesting when we talk on the points, and see
if and where we disagree, so that we can progress.
Certainly. So that might explain to you why I remain on this list.
Good :)
Pirmary matter is an hypothesis that we do in metaphysics/
theology, not in physics.
So if computationalism is just metaphysics/theology, what has it
got to do with the real world?
When you say "yes" to the doctor, you are practising that theology,
and are using some theotechnology, a limit of biotechnology.
If I say "yes" to the doctor, I am simply accepting that if the
brain is replaced by a completely equivalent device, then I will
survive. This is a matter of understanding the physics -- not a
theological matter.
The problem is that we can show that IF I am a machine, THEN I cannot
know which machine I am. So, incompleteness will justify that saying
"yes" to the doctor asks for a genuine leap of faith. It is a theology
in that sense.
John Clark, for example, told us that the did already say yes to a
doctor for some future through cryogenisation.
Then, the whole point is that the computationalist theology is
falsifiable in the real world. So let us see and explore.
OK then. So if the point is to compare computationalism with the
real world, you need to derive results that refer to the real
(experienced physical) world. So you can't really criticize me for
requiring some substantial results, and withholding judgment until
you can produce such results.
The result is that the logic of measure one is given completely at the
propositional by the logic S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*. So we can test them
for Bell's inequality, incommensurability, complementarity, etc. And
we get the fitting until now. The only problem is that we need to
optimize the theorem prover of G* to test more complex quantum
tautologies. More resutls needs more work. The bad publicity I have
heard about my work slow things, alas.
You say that 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact in reality. But that is a fact
only in arithmetical reality.
"only" if you assume something else. Better to be neutral at the
start.
What else? Neutral about what? You assume the arithmetic reality, is
that not something?
I have never heard some parents taking back their kids from school
when they are taught that prime numbers exist. Do you doubt that? It
is used in some part of physics.
It relates to the physical world only if one defines a mapping
between the symbols and experienced objects.
Experienced objects are appearance made by a brain, we don't know
if there is a physical *world*.
We know that we experience something that we call the physical world.
I am OK.
Numbers are perceived by the brain also, so if you are to progress,
you have to find a mapping between them.
Well, some mapping are known, but that is not relevant. the reasoning
was supposed to explain that we have to derive the existence of the
brain from a statistics on computations, whose existence is derived
from 2+2=4 and alike.
let me put it in this way: assuming computationalism, we know that
there is a highly complex web of dreams in arithmetic. Just this
should make us suspect that there is a primary physical reality. Then
indeed, what is it, and how can it drive the consciousness present in
the arithmetical reality?
And the point is that if we assume digital mechanism, then below
our level of substitution, there is an infinity of universal
numbers which competes for your continuations. mechanism entails an
2^aleph_0-plication experience. We can't use the traditional
identity links.
And that model has not been shown to produce anything like our
experienced world. That is the shortcoming of your position.
The point is that IF computationalism is correct, physics has not been
able to do that too. It needs a mind-brain identity link which can no
more work. But at least we do have an explanation (to be tested) which
explain the appearance of the physical (and consciousness, or most of
it).
So you have to map the computations of the dovetailer to the world,
Which world?
Don't be obtuse. The experienced physical world, that is what I have
been talking about. If you want to deny experience, go ahead. But we
have to assume that our experience of the world, all other things
being equal, is veridicial.
On the contrary. I do not deny the experience, but the comp hypothesis
makes it already belonging to arithmetic, and adding a "real world" to
it cannot work.
My work just show that with mechanism, the mind-body problem is two
times more difficult: we have to explain not only consciousness (but
here computer science and mathematical logic gives string clues), but
we have to explain the appearance/experience of the entire physical
reality through it, and here too, mathematical logic gives interesting
non trivial clue. If this works, it generalize Darwin: the laws of
physical appearances "evolve" is a logico-theological structure.
and that mapping is not part of the definition of the dovetailer.
Indeed. The dovetailer is executed in the model of arithmetic.
You seem to want to construct the necessary mapping by reference
to the perceived world, but that makes the perceived world
logically prior to your account of it -- you can't account for it
unless you already assume it.
I don't come up with any world.
So your theory has failed to account for experience.
I meant primary world.On the contrary, comp explains "(first person)
experience", and if it works, also the 3p experiment. Physicalism (not
physics) eliminate the experience, or introduce unintelligible dualism.
Strictly speaking, we have already an explanation of the quantum
appearance,
Not really. Some logic that has some features in common with some of
the proposed quantum logics is a pretty thin achievement. After all,
it is a widespread view that there is not really any specific
quantum logic -- there is just propositional logic applied in
different situations. You always interpret these more abstract
logics in terms of ordinary propositional logic, so they are
derivative and can be disregarded.
I defined the physical from the arithmetic and computationalism, and
we get the right structure at the right place. Physics fails on both
account. It works on prediction, but miss the big picture we search.
If this does not work, you will still have the job to build a non
computationalist theory of mind. In all case we progress.
I am not defending a new theory. I am just proposing to test one of
the oldest theory of mind which exists: the theory according to which
there no magic involved. Non-mechanism is usually considered as
"superstition" or "fairy tales".
but it is an open problem if there is anything even looking like a
complete physical worlds. It is more like a web of dreams with a
coherent core leading to deep sharable computations, or relatively
stable multi-user video games. You can't invalidate an argument by
invoking your own theory (which seems to assume that there is some
world).
There is conscious experience, and that is all that is necessary.
If you deny that there is experience,
Steo 0 of UDA makes clear that experience is not denied, and then
incompleteness rehabilitates the oldest theory of experience and
knowledge.
it seems strange that you should be so concerned about
consciousness! You can invalidate an argument by showing that its
conclusions are not in accord with the facts. Your argument has to
be sound -- mere formal validity is not enough. If the conclusions
do not accord with observation, then you have gone wrong somewhere.
It is not necessary for the critic to find the mistake. That is your
problem.
That is why we have to test, before abandoning the theory. The point
is that in the context of the mechanist hypothesis, the test favors it
against physicalism, which eliminates mind when it is dig rigorously.
Eliminative materialism is not a coincidence.
Bruno
Bruce
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