On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 2:49:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which > > is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer > > Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the > > mind, and physicalism. > > This is false. The argument doesn't show that. In fact I think it > implies that the physical is necessary. Bruno is found of saying that > it makes computation basic. But computation apparently explains too > much. So it is only by saying that somehow what we experience as mental > and physical is picked out does computationalism "explain" the world. I > don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since > it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical". > > Brent >
Without necessarily getting into information theory too deeply we can see that computation has some impact on the information theoretic scale of a system. An easy example is SU(2) vs SU(3). SU(2) has one weight, corresponding to two eigenvalues, and two roots that act as raising and lowering operation on the weight. This is seen in the standard spin model of fermions. The SU(3) model has two weights with three values, corresponding to the 3,3-bar representations of color charges, and 6 roots that transform between the weights. This has more computation and also more degrees of freedom. So the more computation there is, where a Feynman diagram could be thought of as a succession of operations or computations that raise or lower various quantum numbers by exchanging with other quantum numbers, the more degrees of freedom there are. LC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
