On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 7:18:31 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, [email protected] wrote: >> >> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, [email protected] >> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote: >>>> >>>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> > >>>>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. >>>>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is >>>>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> According to >>>> >>>> Copenhagen >>>> >>>> Wigner's friend >>>> >>>> opens the cat box and that >>>> >>>> collapses >>>> >>>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend >>>> >>>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend >>>> >>>> is also in a box and Wigner >>>> >>>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his >>>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state". >>>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside >>>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the >>>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen >>>> >>>> interpretation is useless if you're >>>> interest is in >>>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside >>>> to >>>> universe observe it. >>>> >>>> And God >>>> is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, >>>> and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to >>>> mention. >>>> >>>> >>>> And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could >>>> *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all >>>> computations? >>>> But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in >>>> the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way >>>> allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently. >>>> >>>> Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics embed the mathematicians in >>>> the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x). >>>> >>>> Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth >>>> level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the >>>> machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite >>>> different logics. >>>> >>>> Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the >>>> head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR There is a God. His name is >>> Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have >>> an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG * >>> >> >> *Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by >> a Mathematician. AG* >> >> Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very >> elementary arithmetic: >> >> That is classical logic + >> >> 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number) >> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors) >> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor) >> x+0 = x (if you add zero to a number, you get that >> number) >> x+s(y) = s(x+y) (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, >> you get the successor of x added to y) >> x*0=0 (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0) >> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x (if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you >> get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y) >> >> I do not assume anything more than this. >> > > *You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists > that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world,* > > Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I tend > to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2. > > *with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something > immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. > Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS. * > > You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer science. > The notion of computation has been discovered by mathematician, working on > the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, Post, Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). > Do not confuse the arithmetical notion of universal machine with the > physical implementations of universal machine (like brain, computer, cells, > ...). > *I've worked with the computer operating system on the Galileo spacecraft which orbited Jupiter, a very complex system, but I have no idea what you mean by "computation". How do you distinguish computation from what I am familiar with? AG *
> > I assume only that the brain is Turing emulable, which is not much as we > don't have any evidence that there is something in nature which is not > Turing emulable, except for the controversial wave packet reduction. > *What does Turing emulable mean? AG * > > Then, I show, by a reasoning, that Mechanism makes Primary Matter not able > to justify our first person impression with the observable, and that > reasoning shows that we cannot eventually assume more than RA, for the > ontology. Then PA or ZF are enough for the epistemology and the physics, > but we look only to its internal mimic in Q (RA). > *What is Mechanism, RA, PA? ZF = Zermelo-Franko? AG* * Also, you make the claim that from this you can derive or infer QM. Sounds like the case of a monkey at a typewriter, which, when given sufficient time, can type out Hamlet, or better yet a numerical representation of Beethoven's 9th Symphony.* No. Quite the contrary. It makes physics unique and unavoidable for all universal machine in arithmetic. You might confuse "mechanism" in cognitive science, and "digital physicalism": the idea that the physical reality is the output of a program. Even if that is the case, that unique program (unique up to renaming in arithmetic) must be justified by the statistic on all computations and self-reference. * I give you credit for the guts to tackle the mind-body problem, but I never found Plato's theory of knowledge persuasive.* Nor me. But the universal machine explains why it has to be counter-intuitive. *What is the universal machine? If arithmetic is rooted, as I believe, in empirical observations, how could a universal machine exist in some Platonic realm of Ideas? The concepts are contradictory. AG* > *Also, it could very well be the case that our concept of arithmetic is > Darwinian based; namely, that it originates from the primitive observation > of self and other, or one and many; that is, empirically based. AG* > > Our concept of arithmetic is very plausibly Darwinian based, but Darwin, > to make sense needs the DNA, and the numbers (and even Digital Mechanism, > as confirmed by the DNA RNA protein cycle with or without its many > exceptions, like always with life and universal machineries) > > Then everybody agree on numbers, but on consciousness, or even Darwin, the > debate is harder. I prefer to assume only things where everybody agree > (besides mechanism, which is one of the older human metaphysics, probably > older than materialism). > > I don't claim any truth. I proved that Mechanism is constructively > (testably) incompatible with Materialism (in their weakest sense). Then the > tests are in favor of mechanism, up to now. > > Bruno > > > > >> I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume some >> WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will can be >> ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/numbers and >> their computations, which provably exist in the theory above. >> >> It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe, >> without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take that as >> an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic philosophers with >> the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments can lead to an ontology, >> except for the personal consciousness. Physics is not metaphysics, unless >> you assume Aristotle theology, i.e. you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, >> that is, if you assume physicalism at the start. But then you need to >> abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. personally, I don't know, >> but I study the logical consequence of mechanism, and it predicts that all >> machine must find quantum physics in their head, and this has been >> partially tested and verified. It is all we can say. >> >> Bruno >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
