On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, [email protected] > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> > >>>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. >>>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is >>>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? >>>> >>> >>> >>> According to >>> >>> Copenhagen >>> >>> Wigner's friend >>> >>> opens the cat box and that >>> >>> collapses >>> >>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend >>> >>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend >>> >>> is also in a box and Wigner >>> >>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his >>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state". >>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside >>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the >>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen >>> >>> interpretation is useless if you're >>> interest is in >>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside >>> to >>> universe observe it. >>> >>> And God >>> is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, >>> and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to >>> mention. >>> >>> >>> And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could >>> *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all >>> computations? >>> But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in >>> the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way >>> allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently. >>> >>> Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics embed the mathematicians in >>> the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x). >>> >>> Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth level, >>> of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the machine cannot >>> justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite different logics. >>> >>> Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the >>> head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR There is a God. His name is Plato. >> He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have an >> infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG * >> > > > *Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by > a Mathematician. AG * > > > > Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very > elementary arithmetic: > > That is classical logic + > > 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number) > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors) > x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor) > x+0 = x (if you add zero to a number, you get that > number) > x+s(y) = s(x+y) (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, > you get the successor of x added to y) > x*0=0 (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0) > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x (if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you > get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y) > > I do not assume anything more than this. >
*You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world, with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS. Also, you make the claim that from this you can derive or infer QM. Sounds like the case of a monkey at a typewriter, which, when given sufficient time, can type out Hamlet, or better yet a numerical representation of Beethoven's 9th Symphony. I give you credit for the guts to tackle the mind-body problem, but I never found Plato's theory of knowledge persuasive. Also, it could very well be the case that our concept of arithmetic is Darwinian based; namely, that it originates from the primitive observation of self and other, or one and many; that is, empirically based. AG* > > I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume some > WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will can be > ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/numbers and > their computations, which provably exist in the theory above. > > It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe, > without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take that as > an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic philosophers with > the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments can lead to an ontology, > except for the personal consciousness. Physics is not metaphysics, unless > you assume Aristotle theology, i.e. you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, > that is, if you assume physicalism at the start. But then you need to > abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. personally, I don't know, > but I study the logical consequence of mechanism, and it predicts that all > machine must find quantum physics in their head, and this has been > partially tested and verified. It is all we can say. > > Bruno > > > > >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
