On 21 Dec 2017, at 23:35, [email protected] wrote:



On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 7:18:31 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, [email protected] wrote:
On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, [email protected] wrote:
On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, [email protected] wrote:

On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, <[email protected]> wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?

​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​ himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state". And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​ universe observe it.

And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to mention.

And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all computations? But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.

Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics embed the mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).

Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite different logics.

Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.

Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR There is a God. His name is Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG

Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by a Mathematician. AG
Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very elementary arithmetic:

That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x)                     (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors) x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor) x+0 = x (if you add zero to a number, you get that number) x+s(y) = s(x+y) (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, you get the successor of x added to y)
x*0=0                   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x (if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)

I do not assume anything more than this.

You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world,
Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I tend to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2.
with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS.
You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer science. The notion of computation has been discovered by mathematician, working on the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, Post, Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). Do not confuse the arithmetical notion of universal machine with the physical implementations of universal machine (like brain, computer, cells, ...).

I've worked with the computer operating system on the Galileo spacecraft which orbited Jupiter, a very complex system, but I have no idea what you mean by "computation". How do you distinguish computation from what I am familiar with? AG

I use computation in the original sense of Turing, also found by Post, Church, ...

I am not entirely sure that "operating system" will help, because an operating system is to a universal machine what a bureaucratic environment, if not a straitjacked, is for a human.

But I understand the importance of being strait with little robots when we send them in space, it is like with the little kids. Congratulation for working on such beautiful project.

Now, do you know what a universal programming language is? I guess so. It is a language in which you can explain how to compute, in a finite number of step, a computable function.

Do you know what is an interpreter for a programming language? It is a universal program capable of understanding a universal programming language.

Later, and also before, there has been "universal program languages", or "universal digital machine notions", defined, purely mathematically. It has also been discovered (the big work was already in Gödel 1931) that elementary arithmetic *is* such a universal programming system.

The computation, with respect to the choice of the universal system, is the sequence of elementary steps the universal machine will do when interpreting the universal language.

Then it can be shown that all universal system can mimic all universal system. They are not just able to compute the same class of computable functions from N to N, or similar, but they can mimic the manner the computations are done, and they can mimic themselves. The game of life invented by Conway has ben proved to be Turing universal, and here are two videos which illustrates a little bit:

A universal system (Register machine) and its Conway-Life emulation appear at 2:26 in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2vgICfQawE&t=260s
(careful, after 3:57, it is a variant of Game-of-Life).

Can't resist to invite you to contemplate and understand in some non trivial sense a universal can simulate itself.

Here, a computation is a sequence of pattern following the laws of the game of life (explained at the beginning of the first video).

Now, it is not obvious, but the elementary arithmetical reality is itself a universal machinery, and its the truth emulate all computations (on all oracles, even, so it is more general, but I don't want enter in the jargon).


I assume only that the brain is Turing emulable, which is not much as we don't have any evidence that there is something in nature which is not Turing emulable, except for the controversial wave packet reduction.

What does Turing emulable mean? AG

It means "being able to be imitated by a Turing machine". All known laws of physics lead to computable solutions, although the use of real numbers complexifies a bit the notion.

Mathematically, we can show the existence of non Turing emulable relations, and it should be noted that most attributes of the universal machine itself are NOT computable. Universality leads to semi-computability, and the universal machine is typically not predictible on the middle run.

Then the math shows that they have a testable "neo-platonic"-like theology (testable by its including of physics). It (retro)-predicts "many-histories", and its quantum logic.








Then, I show, by a reasoning, that Mechanism makes Primary Matter not able to justify our first person impression with the observable, and that reasoning shows that we cannot eventually assume more than RA, for the ontology. Then PA or ZF are enough for the epistemology and the physics, but we look only to its internal mimic in Q (RA).

What is Mechanism, RA, PA? ZF = Zermelo-Franko? AG


Mechanism is Descartes idea that the brain is a ntural machine. here we use "digital mechanism", which is Descartes made mathematically precise than to Turing, Post, Kleene, Gödel, ...





Also, you make the claim that from this you can derive or infer QM. Sounds like the case of a monkey at a typewriter, which, when given sufficient time, can type out Hamlet, or better yet a numerical representation of Beethoven's 9th Symphony.
No. Quite the contrary. It makes physics unique and unavoidable for all universal machine in arithmetic. You might confuse "mechanism" in cognitive science, and "digital physicalism": the idea that the physical reality is the output of a program. Even if that is the case, that unique program (unique up to renaming in arithmetic) must be justified by the statistic on all computations and self-reference.
I give you credit for the guts to tackle the mind-body problem, but I never found Plato's theory of knowledge persuasive.
Nor me. But the universal machine explains why it has to be counter- intuitive.

What is the universal machine?


The discovery of Alan Turing. A program which "undersatnd" all programs of a universal programming language. An interpreter.

The programs are enumerable P_0, P_1, P_2, P_3, ...

Relatively to such enumeration, P_u is a universal program, or u is a universal number when P_u(x,y) = P_x(y). If you want, P_u is the computer/interpreter, x is the program, and y is the data, and P_x(y). We say that u emulates x on the input y.





If arithmetic is rooted, as I believe, in empirical observations,

Human arithmetic is certainly rooted in empirical observation, but the physical theories assumes elementary arithmetic, in general, as theories, or physics becomes circular. You would need to define 2 is term of relative observer when used in E = mc^2. "-Sorry Einstein, but your theory relies on a non defined too much naive concept, the number 2, that's metaphysics, not physics. Failed". That sounds stupid, many critics of my work are of that type. They introduce metaphysical assumption to avoid a logical consequence. It is like creationism invalid use of God against evolution theory. To make a ontological commitment to hide a conceptual difficulty. And the collapse is a bit a similar error.

Empirical observation are important to guess the right metaphysics, but there is no direct evidence for any ontological commitment. My work gives a way to test materialism or mechanism, and from what we know today, the evidences side on mechanism, against materialism. The match is not over!



how could a universal machine exist in some Platonic realm of Ideas? The concepts are contradictory. AG

If you have the ability to understand the proof of the existence of the prime number in elementary arithmetic, then you have the ability to understand the arithmetical definition of the "Turing universal machine" and the proof of its existence, and of all computations, also.

It needs a tedious work, with some subtle difficulties. But Gödel saw the difficulties, and solved them all. It is the bomb of the 20th century.

Later, Kleene discovered what he has called "Church's thesis", also attributed to Turing, which makes incompleteness becoming an "easy" exercize (for those who know the diagonalization technic).

A good readable introduction is Cutland's book "Computability". (There are many others).


The universal machine does not exist in a platonic sense, I mean no more than the prime numbers exist in a platonic sense. It exist in the sense of theorems following your agreement that either 4 + 5 is equal to 1000 or 4 + 5 is not equal to 1000. Metaphysics is for later.

Bruno




Also, it could very well be the case that our concept of arithmetic is Darwinian based; namely, that it originates from the primitive observation of self and other, or one and many; that is, empirically based. AG
Our concept of arithmetic is very plausibly Darwinian based, but Darwin, to make sense needs the DNA, and the numbers (and even Digital Mechanism, as confirmed by the DNA RNA protein cycle with or without its many exceptions, like always with life and universal machineries)

Then everybody agree on numbers, but on consciousness, or even Darwin, the debate is harder. I prefer to assume only things where everybody agree (besides mechanism, which is one of the older human metaphysics, probably older than materialism).

I don't claim any truth. I proved that Mechanism is constructively (testably) incompatible with Materialism (in their weakest sense). Then the tests are in favor of mechanism, up to now.

Bruno




I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume some WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will can be ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/numbers and their computations, which provably exist in the theory above.

It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe, without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments can lead to an ontology, except for the personal consciousness. Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume Aristotle theology, i.e. you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, that is, if you assume physicalism at the start. But then you need to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. personally, I don't know, but I study the logical consequence of mechanism, and it predicts that all machine must find quantum physics in their head, and this has been partially tested and verified. It is all we can say.

Bruno


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