On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the mind, and physicalism.
This is false. The argument doesn't show that. In fact I think it implies that the physical is necessary. Bruno is found of saying that it makes computation basic. But computation apparently explains too much. So it is only by saying that somehow what we experience as mental and physical is picked out does computationalism "explain" the world. I don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".
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