On 12/20/2017 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> wrote:
On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, [email protected]
wrote:
On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, <[email protected]>wrote:
>
I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when
the system measured, which is when the box is opened.
What am I missing?
According to
Copenhagen
Wigner's friend
opens the cat box and that
collapses
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
is also in a box and Wigner
himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his
friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND
a "I see a live cat state". And of course you could put
Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside it and you
could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the
entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
interpretation is useless if you're
interest is in
dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside
to
universe observe it.
And God
is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's
wave function, and even then there would be another
unanswered question too obvious to mention.
And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How
could *anything* select a computation, or a class of
computations, among all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers,
involved in the semi-computable relations, localized
themselves in the relative way allowed by the local
self-referential correctness, apparently.
Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics embed the
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the
structure (N, 0, +, x).
Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the
truth level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc., and the fact
that the machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that
they obey quite different logics.
Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the
quantum "in the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he
is right.
Bruno
*Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR There is a God. His name is
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *
*Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation
manifested by a Mathematician. AG
*
Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very
elementary arithmetic:
That is classical logic +
0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x (if you add zero to a number, you get
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y) (if you add a number x to the successor of a number
y, you get the successor of x added to y)
x*0=0 (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x (if you multiply a number x by the successor of y,
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)
I do not assume anything more than this.
I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume
some WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will
can be ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal
machine/numbers and their computations, which provably exist in the
theory above.
It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe,
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments
can lead to an ontology, except for the personal consciousness.
Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume Aristotle theology, i.e.
you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, that is, if you assume
physicalism at the start. But then you need to abandon the idea that a
brain is Turing emulable.
No you don't.
Brent
personally, I don't know, but I study the logical consequence of
mechanism, and it predicts that all machine must find quantum physics
in their head, and this has been partially tested and verified. It is
all we can say.
Bruno
John K Clark
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