On 20 Dec 2017, at 21:53, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 12/20/2017 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, [email protected] wrote:
On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC,
[email protected] wrote:
On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, <[email protected]> wrote:
> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?
According to Copenhagen Wigner's
friend opens the cat box and that collapses
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend now knows
the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend is also in a box and
Wigner himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens
his friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND
a "I see a live cat state". And of course you could put Wigner
himself in a box with somebody outside it and you could keep
increasing the number of nested boxes until the entire universe
is included, and that is why the Copenhagen interpretation
is useless if you're interest is in dealing in cosmology
because there is nobody outside to universe observe it.
And God is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses
God's wave function, and even then there would be another
unanswered question too obvious to mention.
And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,
apparently.
Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics embed the
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the
structure (N, 0, +, x).
Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey
quite different logics.
Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.
Bruno
Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR There is a God. His name is
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG
Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation
manifested by a Mathematician. AG
Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very
elementary arithmetic:
That is classical logic +
0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different
successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) (except for 0, all numbers have a
predecessor)
x+0 = x (if you add zero to a number, you get
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y) (if you add a number x to the successor of a
number y, you get the successor of x added to y)
x*0=0 (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x (if you multiply a number x by the successor of
y, you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x
with y)
I do not assume anything more than this.
I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I
assume some WILL at the core of the creation. With
computationalism, a will can be ascribed to a machine/number,
relatively to universal machine/numbers and their computations,
which provably exist in the theory above.
It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe,
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor
experiments can lead to an ontology, except for the personal
consciousness. Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume
Aristotle theology, i.e. you assume a PRIMARY physical universe,
that is, if you assume physicalism at the start. But then you need
to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable.
No you don't.
Digital mechanism logically reverse the charge. If you commit yourself
in some deity (in the greek sense, it can be non personal), like
Primary Matter, it is up to you to explain how that deity can make
some computation more real ... but still Turing emulable. You have to
explain how your deity can make the selection, and yet without rising
doubt that the digitalist doctor might not been always missing
something.
That the physical relations originates from number relations does not
seem to me more astonishing than the fact that the human relations
originate from chemo-physical reactions.
Keep in mind that the computable part of arithmetic is only a very
tiny part of the whole arithmetical reality, and that the machines, by
the first person indeterminacy are related to that non computable
part, even by just looking inward. The real bomb is Gödel's
incompleteness, and the inexhaustibility of the arithmetical truth.
Bruno
Brent
personally, I don't know, but I study the logical consequence of
mechanism, and it predicts that all machine must find quantum
physics in their head, and this has been partially tested and
verified. It is all we can say.
Bruno
John K Clark
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