> On 25 Mar 2018, at 19:57, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 3/25/2018 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 21 Mar 2018, at 22:56, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 3/21/2018 2:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 at 5:45 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 3/20/2018 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 9:03 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 3/20/2018 1:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 6:34 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 3/20/2018 3:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>>>> The interesting thing is that you can draw conclusions about >>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>> without being able to define it or detect it. >>>>>>> I agree. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The claim is that IF an entity >>>>>>>> is conscious THEN its consciousness will be preserved if brain >>>>>>>> function is >>>>>>>> preserved despite changing the brain substrate. >>>>>>> Ok, this is computationalism. I also bet on computationalism, but I >>>>>>> think we must proceed with caution and not forget that we are just >>>>>>> assuming this to be true. Your thought experiment is convincing but is >>>>>>> not a proof. You do expose something that I agree with: that >>>>>>> non-computationalism sounds silly. >>>>>> >>>>>> But does it sound so silly if we propose substituting a completely >>>>>> different kind of computer, e.g. von Neumann architecture or one that >>>>>> just records everything instead of an episodic associative memory, for >>>>>> the brain. The Church-Turing conjecture says it can compute the same >>>>>> functions. But does it instantiate the same consciousness. My >>>>>> intuition is that it would be "conscious" but in some different way; for >>>>>> example by having the kind of memory you would have if you could review >>>>>> of a movie of any interval in your past. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it would be conscious in the same way if you replaced neural >>>>>> tissue with a black box that interacted with the surrounding tissue in >>>>>> the same way. It doesn’t matter what is in the black box; it could even >>>>>> work by magic. >>>>> >>>>> Then why draw the line at "surrounding tissue". Why not the external >>>>> enivironment? >>>>> >>>>> Keep expanding the part that is replaced and you replace the whole brain >>>>> and the whole organism. >>>>> >>>>> Are you saying you can't imagine being "conscious" but in a different way? >>>>> >>>>> I think it is possible but I don’t think it could happen if my neurones >>>>> were replaced by a functionally equivalent component. If it’s >>>>> functionally equivalent, my behaviour would be unchanged, >>>> >>>> I agree with that. But you've already supposed that functional >>>> equivalence at the behavior level implies preservation of consciousness. >>>> So what I'm considering is replacements in the >>>> brain far above the neuron level, say at the level of whole functional >>>> groups of the brain, e.g. the visual system, the auditory system, the >>>> memory,... Would functional equivalence at the body/brain interface then >>>> still imply consciousness equivalence? >>>> >>>> I think it would, because I don’t think there are isolated consciousness >>>> modules in the brain. A large enough change in visual experience will be >>>> noticed by the subject, who will report that things look different. This >>>> could only happen if there is a change in the input to the language system >>>> from the visual system; but we have assumed that the output from the >>>> visual system is the same, and only the consciousness has changed, leading >>>> to a contradiction. >>> >>> But what about internal systems which are independent of perception...the >>> very reason Bruno wants to talk about dream states. And I'm not >>> necessarily asking that behavior be identical...just that the body/brain >>> interface be the same. The "brain" may be different in how it processes >>> input from the eyeballs and hence report verbally different perceptions. >>> In other words, I'm wondering how much does computationalism constrain >>> consciousness. My intuition is that there could be a lot of difference in >>> consciousness depending on how different perceptual inputs are process >>> and/or merged and how internal simulations are handled. To take a crude >>> example, would it matter if the computer-brain was programmed in a >>> functional language like LISP, an object-oriented language like Ruby, or a >>> neural network? Of course Church-Turing says they all compute the same set >>> of functions, but they don't do it the same way >> >> They can do it in the same way. They will not do it in the same way with a >> compiler, but will do it in the same way when you implement an interpreter >> in another interpreter. The extensional CT (in terms if which functions are >> calculated) entails the intensional CT (in terms of which computations can >> be processed. Babbage machine could emulate a quantum brain. It involves a >> relative slow-down, but the subject will not notice without external clues. >> In arithmetic, all possible sorts of computers are implemented infinitely >> often, with some special redundancy which plays a role in the computations >> statistics, the first person statistics and the origin of the physical >> appearances. > > You retreat into what is possible. My question is much more directly > pragmatic. If I actually made a silicon based replacement for your brain > that had the same input/output would you consciousness be different if the > replacement processed the information differently...and how could you or we > know?
Not necessarily, unless you mean all my possible behaviour, including the infinite one. For a finite time, a zombie might be able to imitated me, or some of my behaviour enough well to fail people. The level of substitution is more precise than “behaviour”, as what is maintained is the behaviour of the relevant entities at some level, this might includes all the internal inputs and outputs of all particular neurons. I think I have already said that I tend to think that the substation level is the particles/waves up to the Heisenberg uncertainty. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
