> On 26 Mar 2018, at 22:09, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 3/26/2018 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> You retreat into what is possible. My question is much more directly >>> pragmatic. If I actually made a silicon based replacement for your brain >>> that had the same input/output would you consciousness be different if the >>> replacement processed the information differently...and how could you or we >>> know? >> >> Not necessarily, unless you mean all my possible behaviour, including the >> infinite one. For a finite time, a zombie might be able to imitated me, or >> some of my behaviour enough well to fail people. >> >> The level of substitution is more precise than “behaviour”, as what is >> maintained is the behaviour of the relevant entities at some level, this >> might includes all the internal inputs and outputs of all particular >> neurons. I think I have already said that I tend to think that the >> substation level is the particles/waves up to the Heisenberg uncertainty. >> > The problem with that level of substitution is that the wave-function of the > brain (or even of one neuron) is an extreme idealization.
Yes, it is a complex sum/statistics of infinities of computation/sigma_1 sentences. To emulate exactly a physical object you need an infinite computations, at least when assuming Digital Mechanism, or indexical computatianlism (yes doctor). Here I am not sure which theory you are assuming. If you assume a primary physical reality behind the wave, then you cannot use digital mechanism, as it requires the physical reality being a first person plural emergence from that infinite sum. You need only to believe if 3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 6^3 is true of false, independently of you verifying it or not. > The brain (or neuron) as a quantum system not isolated and will be entangled > with a lot of the environment, including that outside the body. The is no > such thing as "the wave-function of a brain”. I agree. It is all in the head of the universal Turing machine, verifiably so (and up to now it fits and explain both the sharable quanta and the private qualia). > > But I raised the question precisely because of this extreme disconnect > between discussions of the "level of substitution" and the "consciousness as > detected by behavior”. Not really, because “behaviour of neurons” was ambiguous for me, is it the behaviour of the relevant part, the whole (non computable) possible parts, or the mundane behaviour of the person incarnated by that brain/body relatively to me? It matters, because with mechanism, consciousness and intelligence is not in the physical reality, it is the physical reality which evolves (arithmetic logically) in dreams of the universal person, which differentiates along the distinguishable computations, with weight provided by the mathematics of the “material modes” of self-reference. It works, making, up to now, the Everett Wave into a sort of phenomenological fixed point of the universal self-introscting machine. Physics becomes a number-theoretical phenomenon due to the ability of the numbers to be involved in infinitely may (sigma_1) relation, and reflex on themselves. That is not a threat for physics, but it is a threat for metaphysical physicalism or materialism, as it is (imho) the only theory which explains as much as possible the quanta, the qualia and their mathematically precise relation, and this from a very simple set of equation, like Kxy = x and Sexy = xy(yz). (And very few identity rules of the type, derive xz = yz from x = y. There is non zombies with mechanism, not because we can derive consciousness from body-behaviour, but because we just cannot do that, as their are no really “body-behavior”, as there are no bodies: the intelligence and the consciousness is a collective works of all numbers or all combinators or all Turing Universal Machines. Every bodies or every numbers are zombies, in some sense, but the soul is in the actual true relations. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
