> On 27 Mar 2018, at 21:58, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 3/27/2018 9:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> There is non zombies with mechanism, not because we can derive consciousness >> from body-behaviour, but because we just cannot do that, as their are no >> really “body-behavior”, as there are no bodies: the intelligence and the >> consciousness is a collective works of all numbers or all combinators or all >> Turing Universal Machines. Every bodies or every numbers are zombies, in >> some sense, but the soul is in the actual true relations. > You're retreating into metaphysics and avoiding the problem.
The problem belongs to metaphysics, although I prefer the term “theology”, so it is hardly retreating. And, yes, with the correct metaphysics enforced by Mechanism, the problem of zombies is dissolved indeed, as there is no matter/bodies having an ontological existence, only phenomenological. (We do metaphysics/TOE/theology here. It is here you often use your metaphysical hypothesis of a primary (non reducible) notion of physical universe. The existence of a *primary* physical universe is NOT an hypothesis of any physical theory.) > If I build two robots that are equally intelligent What could that mean? > and human like in their behavior (but not assuming them be identical in > behavior) can I make one that is conscious and the other either not-conscious > or conscious in a very different way that I won't be able to recognize as > such? If the two robots are "equally intelligent", why would we not assume they have an equivalent consciousness? What do you mean by “equally intelligent”? The “physical” computations don’t make them intelligent/conscious, but win the first person indeterminacy and will stabilise the environment. The physical is here the first person plural “winner” on a statistic onn the infinitely many arithmetical true relations. (The measure one necessitates to obey "[]p & <>p” (as can be explained). The robot’ bodies just give you a chance to discuss with it, and gives the person supported by the robot bodies some ability to do the same with respect to you. Matter creates nothing, but change the relative probabilities of consciousness manifestations. Keep in mind in this theory there is only K, S, (K K), …; or, 0, 1, 2, 3, …, with their usual respective laws (which happens to be Turing complete (universal, creative) theory. > Or to give a more concrete biological example, is the consciousness of an > octopus similar to that of a mouse; It is the same consciousness at its most succinct state. Consciousness perhaps cosmic, divine, might be the consciousness of the universal machine, alias Robinson Arithmetic. ,It is dissimilar only its its content and a qualia intensity, except that here, from the behaviours we might say they share also some comparable intelligence. Some cuttlefishes solves comparable problem than some apes. But I don’t really believe in the IQ test, which evaluate only a small era of competence. Intelligence, and consciousness are semantical notion that we can define for much simpler machine than us, and show that no machine sound can define in its own language what they experience: it is not comparable, except in possible meta-fusion, like when awakening and realising where were doing two different dreams at once. The consciousness of Robinson Arithmetic is a dissociate state of consciousness. “She” has no eyes, no arms, no ears, no nose, yet “she" is conscious, in a highly dissociative state, but that state is more what the brain hides than what the brain would secreted or create. I suspect we get it in Non REM sleep, but it is not really a "memorisable state”, nor even an imaginable state (by the machine for itself). Now, the Löbian machine is the one which believes in Peano arithmetic. They believe in enough induction axioms, allowing to discover that they are “universal” and all the price of it and the infinitely many interrogations. > or does the very different neural structure imply a difference in > consciousness? Not per se. But having 8 arms and living in water will differentiates the type of experiences available. Octopus might not be afraid by cat, and mouse do not dare about big fishes. But it is the same consciousness of the universal machine, just differentiated by different contingencies. I recall that a computation can be defined in many ways. Like a succession of reduction of combinators, or a sequence of instantaneous description of a (Martin Davis quadruplet) Turing machine. But a combinator reduction can emulate a sequence of instantaneous description of a Turing machine. And a Turing machine can emulate combinator reduction. It is the intensional Church thesis. The extensional (usual formulation) says that all such Turing-universal system compute the same class of partial computable function from N to N, and the intensional (which is easy to deduce from the extensional thesis) is that not only they compute the same function, but they can compute it in the same way, at a relevant level. No universal machine can see the difference between being executed by a physical brain in a vat, or by a combinators mimicking its brain in arithmetic. But we can study the math of the computations which “win” the measure one in the ocean of all computations, that all universal number mimic (in arithmetic, or any of your favorite Turing complete system. Usually arithmetic is used to measure the degree of non computability/unsolvability: the Sigma_1-completeness is Turing universality, and the Sigma-67 completeness belongs to a sort of God/Oracle, which can helps, but still miss the “whole truth”. I could reverse the “charge” and ask you one evidence for a primary physical universe. There are none. There are many evidence for a physical reality, but this confirms mechanism which predicts the observable mode (incompleteness enforce the measure on the sigma_1 reality to “obey []p & <>p”, or “[]p & <>t”. Only G* can prove this to be equivalent to p, but the machine makes a crucial distinction, and that obeys a quantum logic which should be investigated more closely. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
