On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


    On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected]
    <javascript:>> wrote:



    On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
    wrote:


        On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:


        Bruno MarchalWrote:

            /> I cannot see primary matter.In fact I am not sure
            what you mean by matter, or by “mathematical-material
            universe”.[...] I have proven (40 years ago) that
            materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or
            physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible./


        If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly
        don't know what "primary matter" means, so what the hell did
        you prove 40 years ago?

        That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a
        sophisticated “sum” on all computations.

        Matter = observable

        Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to
        which there is a primary physical universe, or a primary sort
        of (non mathematical) reality from which those observable
        would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be shown that the
        laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some
        mode of arithmetical self-reference.



        I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means
        because any such answer has to include physics and physics
        has to involve matter which you admit confuses you.

        No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to
        believe that we have to assume its existence. A realm is
        primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”. May
        believe that biology is not primary, because it can be
        reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly,
        with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or
        Turing equivalent.





        And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about
        "Mechanism" , the reply would only contain yet more words
        you can neither define nor give examples of.

        Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of
        description of our body such that we can survive with a
        (physical) digital brain or body, if it faithfully represents
        our body’s functionality at that description level.

        Bruno



    I seems /possible /to me that there could be a matter
    decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me*
    into some code, transports that code, and compiles that code into
    a digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it
    would be *me 2*. and "I" would exist again.

    But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - 
    I don't  think I would exist anymore.

    How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to
    distinguish (without observable clue, by personal introspection)
    if it has been recompiled in a physical reality or in a
    number-theoretical reality imitating my brain below my
    substitution level?
    It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role
    in consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything
    Turing-emulable, but then mechanism is false.But invoking
    (primitive) Matter in this way seems arbitrary, and it
    re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding something
    difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the
    physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to
    your experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which
    emulates all computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a
    machine by another has been discovered in arithmetic.

    Bruno



If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing medical records.

If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.

- pt

That's a point I've made before.  It's all very well to say that you could be replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running your code; but to make that work there would also have to be an emulation of your environment, including its physics.  So then it's not clear that anything is different.  It becomes a metaphysical just-so story.

Brent

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